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Estimating the impact of Critical Habitat designation on the values of developed and
undeveloped parcels (2nd version, current as of 7/29/2022)
Saleh Mamun1,2, Erik Nelson3, Christoph Nolte4,5
Abstract: We use differences-in-differences (DD) estimators to measure the impact that
Endangered Species Act (ESA)’s Critical Habitat (CH) rule had on developed and undeveloped
parcel prices throughout the US between 2000 and 2019. In a national-level analysis we found
that, on average, the price of parcels “treated” with CH were not statistically different than the
prices of nearby parcels in listed species range space but not “treated” by CH. CH’s null impact
on developed parcel prices is surprising given homeowner’s documented willingness to pay for
property surrounded by protected open space. CH’s null impact on undeveloped parcel prices is
surprising as previous research had indicated that the impact of CH on undeveloped parcel
prices was negative due to the additional regulatory costs and development uncertainty the CH
regulation imposes on land developers. When we used relevant subsets of CH areas to measure
CH’s impact on parcel prices, we did occasionally find results that were consistent with
expectations. We reach two conclusions. First, the impact of the economic impact of the CH
rule, holding the impact of other ESA sections constant, cannot be reduced to a simple,
consistent narrative. Second, CH’s relatively minor impact on parcel prices suggests that the
rule does not have much regulatory “bite.”
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1. Introduction
Efforts to conserve biodiversity have increasingly focused on the role that “working”
landscapes can play in such efforts (Garibaldi et al. 2021). As undeveloped area around the
world dwindles due to economic development and climate change continues its relentless
march, farms, managed forests, rangelands, and even suburbs will become the habitat and
migration corridors that species increasingly rely on for survival (Kremen and Merenlender
2018). In some cases, efforts to make working landscapes more biodiversity friendly will require
restrictions on land use and management that could impose economic costs on private
landowners. Understanding the magnitude and patterns of the costs created by biodiversity
protection on working landscapes will be integral to designing effective protection programs
(Hanley et al. 2012). Unfortunately, estimates of the private cost of biodiversity protection on
working landscapes – typically measured by program impact on private land values – are few
(Fois et al. 2019). And those that do exist focus on a landscape or two, and not at the regional
or continental scale that effective biodiversity protection planning will require (Auffenhammer
et al 2020).
In this study we estimate the impact that the Critical Habitat (CH) rule of the
Endangered Species Act (ESA) has had on observed parcel values on landscapes across the
continental US. When a species is listed under the ESA as threatened or endangered, the US
Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) 1 is required to consider whether there are geographic areas that
contain the physical or biological features that are essential to the conservation of the species
and may need special management or protection (USFWS 2017). If such areas are identified,

1

The US National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) in the case of marine species.
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the FWS may propose designating these areas as critical habitat (CH) (USFWS 2017). After
public comment on the proposed CH area, the regulatory agency can choose to finalize the
proposed or a modified CH area. If the FWS does finalize CH area for a listed species, then any
landowner activity in the designated area that requires federal authorization or uses federal
monies cannot proceed unless it is deemed consistent with conservation goals of the ESA
(USFWS 2017). 2 While most CH area is in public land, CH does cover 10’s of millions of private
acres across the US (Fosburgh 2022). Therefore, our estimate of the CH rule’s economic impact
across US landscapes is an important addition to the (currently sparse) literature that estimates
the (private) economic impact of biodiversity protection programs on working landscapes at the
continental scale.
Activities on private land that require US federal authorization or use US federal dollars
– and therefore could be impacted by the CH rule – are numerous. For example, many private
development projects require a water discharge permit from the US Army Corps of Engineers
(Auffhammer et al. 2020); affordable housing developers often use federal funds (Wallace
1995); and farmers can receive Conservation Reserve Program payments from the US
Department of Agriculture by making their land more biodiversity friendly (Melstrom 2020).
Private land activities in CH areas that rely on federal permits or monies and are initially found
in noncompliance with CH rules either must be modified in accordance with regulations or risk
being canceled (Yagerman 1990). Either outcome generates additional costs for the private

Armstrong contends that “[w]ithout critical habitat designation, [ESA regulations are] only required to meet the
minimal goal of avoiding extinction of the species [via the jeopardy standard], rather than the higher goal of
recovery from endangerment [reached through the adverse modification standard],” the goal of the ESA (p. 60,
Armstrong 2002). However, others, including, past FWS administrators, have claimed that the CH rule does not
provide any additional protections above and beyond ESA regulations (Armstrong 2002).

2
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landowner. And even when private activities in CH areas are found in compliance with CH
regulations from the beginning, the delays and extra time associated with the additional federal
scrutiny could mean higher costs for the activity developer than a similar activity in nearby nonCH areas (Sunding 2003).
The possibility of higher land use and management costs and restrictions in CH areas can
also affect private land activities immediately outside of CH boundaries. For example, the
perception, well-founded or not, of additional development restrictions and costs in CH areas
could encourage developers of houses in a regional market to buy land outside of the market’s
CH areas (List et al. 2006). 3 Basic economic theory suggests that a focus on developing land
outside of a region’s CH areas would make undeveloped land inside the region’s CH areas less
valuable relative to the undeveloped land right outside the region’s CH areas, all else equal.
Therefore, our first testable hypothesis is that observed sale prices of undeveloped
parcels (parcels with no houses or other significant development) in CH areas were less than
those in nearby non-CH areas after CH has been designated, all else equal. If the cost of
development projects in CH area are, or even just perceived to be, greater than the cost of
comparable projects in nearby non-CH area then we should be able to find numerical evidence
that developers are paying less for undeveloped parcels in CH areas than in nearby non-CH
areas after CH designation, all else equal. Or, more broadly, we are looking for evidence that a
biodiversity protection program that can limit private activity or may require mitigation actions
adversely impacts the value of undeveloped land in program areas (e.g., Bošković and
Nøstbakken 2017).

3

Or race to develop land inside a proposed CH area before the CH is finalized.
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Conversely, we speculate the CH regulation could have a positive effect on existing
house prices in CH areas. For example, consider two nearby neighborhoods, each populated
with a smattering of 5-acre rural residential parcels surrounded by undeveloped parcels. Now
suppose one of these otherwise identical neighborhoods is in a CH area and the other is not.
Houses in the CH area could have higher prices than those in the nearby non-CH area, all else
equal, for two reasons. First, CH regulations could retard, reduce, or, in some cases, stop the
development of neighboring open space. Second, CH designation signals that the houses in the
CH area are surrounded by unique wildlife conditions. Given that Americans are willing to pay a
premium for houses adjacent to open space and in unique wildlife areas (e.g., Geoghegan 2002,
Kiel et al. 2005, Black 2018), it stands to reason that Americans would be willing to pay extra to
live in the CH-designated area – a unique wildlife space that may be protected from further
development.
Therefore, our second testable hypothesis is that observed sale prices for alreadydeveloped parcels in CH areas will be greater than for already-developed parcels in nearby nonCH areas after CH has been designated, all else equal. Assuming American home buyers are
willing to pay more, all else equal, for houses surrounded by open space and unique wildlife
conditions then we should be able to find numerical evidence that home buyers are paying
more for houses in CH areas than in nearby non-CH areas after CH has been designated, all else
equal. Or, more broadly, we are looking for evidence that a biodiversity protection program
that can limit private development activity positively impacts the value of already-developed
land in treated areas.
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We believe our estimates of the economic impact of CH on private land and housing
values improves on the few previously published CH economic impact estimates in several
ways. First, we expand the scope of the analysis to working landscapes across the US. Every
other study that estimates the impact of CH on land values has focused on one or two regions,
typically a few landscapes in California or Arizona. Second, we restricted our analysis to parcel
sales that took place when the parcels were in at least one ESA listed species’ geographic range.
Therefore, we are explicitly measuring the economic impact of CH above and beyond the
economic impact of the ESA regulation in general. Previous studies of CH impact have not
confronted this regulatory impact identification problem and appear to be estimating the
economic impact of an amalgam of CH and larger ESA regulations. Third, we estimate the
impact of CH designation on undeveloped land and housing prices separately given that the CH
rule theoretically affects the value of each asset type very differently. Other than Klick and Ruhl
(2020)’s analysis of four countries in Arizona, every other previous empirical CH analysis has
focused exclusively on undeveloped parcel values. Further, we improve on Klick and Ruhl
(2020)’s analysis by using parcel-level data and specific CH boundaries to identify the economic
impact of CH on housing prices; Klick and Ruhl (2020)’s identification of CH impacts is likely
imprecise as it relied on county-level median housing prices and coarse definitions of CH area.
The rest of the paper is structured thusly. In section 2 we discuss the previous attempts
to understand the impact of CH on private land and housing values. In section 3 we discuss the
unique dataset we used to estimate the impact of CH on private land and housing values on
working landscapes across the continental US. In sections 4 and 5 we discuss our methods and
results, respectively. In section 6 we conclude with an overview of the economic impact of CH
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on private landowners and homeowners, discuss important limitations to our findings, propose
some ways the federal government could facilitate CH program analysis, and discuss how our
findings can contribute a wider effort to estimate the economic impact of a variety of
biodiversity protection programs.

2. Previous literature on CH’s economic impact
Past theoretical and empirical work has investigated the impact of CH on parcel values
and the pace at which vacant parcels are developed. On the theoretical side, Quigley and
Swoboda (2007) used a regional economic model to predict that CH designation prompts the
development of some of the region’s non-CH area parcels that would have otherwise remained
undeveloped. Further, the model’s complete restriction on housing starts in CH areas (a very
unrealistic assumption; see Zabel and Paterson (2006)) causes regional housing prices to
increase. Therefore, consistent with our second hypothesis, housing prices in the region’s CH
areas increase. However, the anticipated increase in housing prices due to the supply shock also
applies to the regional market’s non-CH areas, obviating any price differential between the
region’s regulated and non-regulated areas. Their model does not consider the possibility that
housing prices could differ in regulated versus nonregulated areas within the region due to a
general preference for living among protected open space and unique wildlife.
Based on a survey of developers and a regional economic model, Sunding (2003) and
Sunding et al. (2003) predicted that the California Gnatcatcher’s CH would create an additional
cost of $4,000 per housing unit, delay housing projects by 1 year, and reduce project output by
10% in the treated area due to CH-related permitting, redesign, and mitigation. They also
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predicted that CH regulations would add $10,000 to the cost of each housing unit and delay
completion of housing projects by 1 year in California’s vernal pool species CHs. Further, again
using the survey data, they predicted that the equilibrium housing price in the regions with the
vernal pool species CHs would increase by $30,000 due to developers charging more to cover
their additional regulation-induced costs and the region’s decreased housing supply. Their
predictions that development costs would be higher in CH areas, and therefore, undeveloped
parcel prices in CH areas would be lower than prices outside of CH areas, all else equal, is
consistent with our first hypothesis. However, just like Quigley and Swoboda (2007), their
prediction that the regulation-induced housing shock would equally affect housing prices in and
outside of CH areas in the same region means they do not consider the possibility that housing
prices could differ, all else equal, on either side of a CH border.
Several previously published empirical studies have corroborated our theoretical
prediction that CH regulations decrease the sale price of undeveloped parcels relative to the
price of nearby unregulated undeveloped parcels. For example, looking at two CH areas in
California, Auffhammer et al. (2020) found that the average price of undeveloped parcels in the
CH areas fell relative to undeveloped parcel prices in nearby non-CH areas. Further, List et al.
(2006) found that prices of undeveloped parcels in the proposed (but not yet finalized) Pygmy
Owl CH fell relative to prices for undeveloped parcels in nearby areas not proposed for CH
regulation. Unlike Auffhammer et al. (2020), List et al. (2006) used propensity score matching to
construct a set control set of non-CH undeveloped parcels.
Klick and Ruhl (2020) also investigate the impact of the Pygmy Owl CH on property
values, but in this case, housing values (i.e., developed parcels), not undeveloped parcel values.
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Relative to synthetic controls, they found that the CH, contrary to our theoretical expectation,
reduced housing values. However, they use a housing price index, the Zillow Home Value Index,
that only reports county-level medians. In our opinion, this data generates unreliable treatment
effect estimates for several reasons. First, the Pygmy Owl CH does not align with county
boundaries. Therefore, they use housing price summary statistic that is informed by properties
that were not part of the CH. Second, by using a county-level summary value for housing prices,
Klick and Ruhl (2020) were not able to use the full distribution of observed housing prices and
were not able to control for the impact of property attributes on transaction prices.
Finally, Zabel and Paterson (2006) tested the hypothesis that CH designation depresses
development activity in treated areas by comparing 1990 to 2002 building permit issuances
inside and outside of California CH areas. The treated area was comprised of 39 CHs finalized
between 1979 and 2003 and the control area included the non-CH areas of various
administrative units in the state. The authors found that a median-sized California CH area
experienced a 23.5% decrease in the supply of housing construction permits in the short run
and a 37.0% decrease in the long run relative to the control area. Zabel and Paterson (2006)
surmised that development in CH areas decreased due to the higher development costs and
developmental barriers created by CH regulations. Their finding that housing development was
depressed in CH areas is consistent with our first hypothesis that developers are less interested
in CH-regulated land, and therefore, prices for undeveloped land in CH areas will be lower than
undeveloped land in non-CH areas, all else equal.

3. Data
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The unit of analysis in this study is the sale of a tax assessor parcel. The Zillow
Transaction and Assessment Database (ZTRAX, version: Oct 09, 2019) (Zillow 2019) indicates
the date of each parcel sale in the US from 2000 to 2019. (We do not consider include sales
from 1999 or earlier because we do not believe that ZTRAX’s sales data from that era are
reliable.) If the sold parcel contained a house then ZTRAX also indicates the house’s numbers of
rooms, bedrooms, and bathrooms as of the last modification/renovation, the date of the last
modification/renovation, and the year the house was built. If a house has never been
modified/renovated then the year the house was built was the date of the last
modification/renovation. ZTRAX also indicates the tax and zoning status of each parcel.
We obtained digital maps of tax assessor parcels from twelve open-source state-level
datasets and two commercial providers (Loveland and Boundary Solutions, Inc.). The year of the
parcel maps vary by state and county. Generally speaking, most parcel maps we use are from
2019. ZTRAX records have been linked to digital parcel boundaries based on assessor parcel
numbers, using a customized algorithm for syntax pattern matching and conversion (Nolte
2020). We do not use ZTRAX data that cannot be linked to parcels on our parcel map due to
subsequent parcel subdivisions or consolidation. Further, we omitted arm-length sales from our
dataset because they do not convey market value of parcels.
We used multiple other data sources to generate a suite of variables that described
each parcel’s physical characteristics and the conditions on the landscape surrounding the
parcel. We used footprints for 125.2 million buildings from Microsoft’s open-source building
footprint dataset (Microsoft 2018) to compute the parcel’s number of buildings and percentage
of area covered by buildings, circa 2012. Land cover on each parcel as of 2011 was estimated
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using the 2011 National Land Cover Database (NLCD) (Homer et al. 2015). We extracted
average slope and elevation for each parcel from the National Elevation Dataset (USGS 2017a).
We used the National Hydrography Dataset (USGS 2017b), buffering, and polygon intersections
to estimate water (lake, river, and reservoir) frontage for each parcel as of 2017. Further, we
computed the percentage of each parcel’s wetland coverage as of 2018 with the National
Wetlands Inventory Seamless Wetlands Dataset (USFWS 2018).
The density of building footprints within 5 km of each parcel’s centroid was calculated
using Microsoft’s open-source building footprint dataset (Microsoft 2018). Each parcel’s
proximity to coastal waters is measured as percent ocean area within a 2,500 m radius circle
centered on the parcel (North American Water Polygons; ESRI 2009). To measure travel time to
the closest major city from each parcel we used a global raster that indicates travel times,
incorporating road networks, terrain, land cover, and other data all as of 2000, to cities with a
population of 50,000 people or more (NAD 83, EPSG: 4269) (Nelson 2008;
http://forobs.jrc.ec.europa.eu/products/gam/sources.php). Parcel distance to highways and
paved and unpaved roads is based on the 2019 TIGER roads dataset (USCB 2019). Finally, we
computed the percentage area within 1 km of each parcel that is protected via fee simple
ownership or an easement as of the year 2010 (USGS 2018, The Trust for Public Land & Ducks
Unlimited 2020, Harvard Forest 2020, Colorado Natural Heritage Program 2019).
All CH maps were downloaded from a FWS website
(https://ecos.fws.gov/ecp/report/table/critical-habitat.html) on XX/XX/XX. The dates of CH
proposals and finalizations were given in FR notices. The links to all relevant FR notices were
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also found on the same FWS website (https://ecos.fws.gov/ecp/report/table/criticalhabitat.html).

4. Methods
4.a. Treated and control sales
We test our hypotheses on the private economic impact of the CH regulation with the
quasi-experimental method difference-in-differences (DD) (Greenstone and Gayer 2009). Year
2000 to 2019 sales of undeveloped parcels (parcels with no buildings) or sales of developed
parcels (zoned as rural-residential in ZTRAX (building code RR102) with positive building
footprint) that took place within a CH boundary either before or after the CH’s final boundary
had been published in the Federal Register (FR) are generally treated sales in our study. In
contrast, 2000 to 2019 sales of undeveloped or developed parcels that have never been inside a
CH boundary but are near a CH boundary (even if the boundary did not exist at the time of the
sale) are generally control sales.
Here we describe the set of parcel sales that, while meeting the general treated and
control eligibility requirements, are not included in our analysis because their inclusion would
unnecessarily complicate our efforts to identify the impact of CH designation on parcel values.
First, if a parcel is in more than one CH, we, with one exception, excluded its sales and its
nearby control sales from our analysis. The exception to this exclusion rule is for parcels that
are affected by one CH but the one CH was established to cover multiple species. 4 We excluded

Of the 1,662,017 developed sales in our final dataset, 5,588 took place in multiple-species CHs. Of the 303,769
undeveloped sales in our final dataset, 2,371 took place in multiple-species CHs.
4
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parcels that were affected by multiple, non-synchronous CHs and their nearby controls because
their sales would complicate identification of the CH impact on parcel value. For example,
suppose a sale of parcel j took place when it was covered by one CH but its next sale took place
when it was covered by two CHs. We believe that these two treated sales and their related
control sales are incomparable given they took place under different regulatory environments.
We do not similarly reject parcels in multiple-species CHs because the degree of regulatory
scrutiny did not change over time like they did for parcels affected by multiple, nonsynchronous CHs.
Second, the sales of parcels that changed from undeveloped to developed status at
some point between 2000 and 2019 were also excluded from our analysis. For example,
suppose parcel j was undeveloped when it sold in 2010 but it was classified as developed when
it sold again in 2015. In this case, all of j’s sales as a developed parcel and its related controls
were excluded from our analysis. We did this because, as noted in the literature review, there is
evidence that building costs are higher in CH areas than in non-CH areas. Therefore, the price
for a house in a CH area built after CH establishment could be higher than an identical house
built in the same CH but before establishment due to the former home’s developer passing on
higher building costs to the home buyer. Identifying CH’s impact on marginal willingness to pay
for homes is cleaner if we avoid, as much as possible, pooling homes built under different
regulatory environments. Further, while we could have retained the original sales of parcels
that transitioned, we dropped these as well. The relatively few parcels in our dataset that
transitioned from undeveloped to developed during the 2000 to 2019 time period could be
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systematically different than the undeveloped parcels that never transitioned.5 Again, by not
pooling undeveloped sales from transitioned parcels and parcels that never developed we
avoid the need to control for the different types of undeveloped parcels in our DD model.
Moreover, because we only observe building characteristics on developed parcels after
the last known modification, we excluded any otherwise eligible sale of a treated or control
developed parcel that occurred before the last recorded modification. If we did not do this our
analysis would include developed parcel sale prices regressed on a set of building
characteristics that may not have yet existed at the time of sale.
Further, we restricted our analysis to parcel sales that took place when the parcels were
in at least one ESA listed species’ geographic range (USFWS 2021). When we restrict our
inclusion of treated and control sales according to this rule then we are explicitly measuring the
economic impact of CH above and beyond the economic impact of the ESA regulation in
general. If we did not exclude sales based on the ESA range criteria then we would be
measuring the economic impact of CH relative to non-CH parcels, which may or may not be
affected by ESA regulations in general. 6
Up to this point, none of the parcel sale exclusion rules necessarily meant a whole CH
and all its related parcel sales were eliminated from our dataset (thought that is a possibility).
Our final two exclusion rules did eliminate whole CHs and their related sales. First, if a CH is not
in the contiguous US all its otherwise eligible sales (treated and control) were dropped from our

Of the 27,524,525 eligible parcels in our dataset, 98,4239 or 0.36% changed development status sometime
between 2000 and 2109.
6
See Malone and Melstrom (2020) for an estimate of the impact of the ESA regulation in general (not just the CH
rule) on cattle producers’ net returns.
5
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dataset. Second, all sales of parcels in (treated) or near (control) a CH that was established via a
“complex” process were also excluded from our analysis. A CH had a complex establishment
process if its proposed or finalized boundaries changed at least once.7 We dropped sales from
these CHs because their inclusion would have made our causality claims more dubious. First,
consider CH processes that generate a succession of two or more final CH maps. In these cases,
we cannot discern which parcels j were part of earlier finalized CHs as the FWS does not
provide digital maps of now defunct CH boundaries. Therefore, definitively flagging sales on the
affected landscape in certain years as treated or not would be impossible. Second, consider a
CH process with two or more rounds of proposed boundaries before a single finalization. We
dropped sales related to these type of complex CH processes because of treatment timing
heterogeneity. Across all “simple” CH processes – CHs with one proposal FR notice and one final
FR notice – the treatment pattern is uniform: “before proposal” - “single comment period” “after finalization.” If we pooled CHs with different treatment timing regimes, for example,
those with simple CH processes and others with the treatment pattern “before proposal” “comment period for first proposal” - “comment period for second proposal” - “after
finalization,” then identification of CH’s impact on parcel values would be murkier. Therefore,
only the sales of parcels in (treated) or near (control) a “simple” CH are established between
2000 and 2019 were included in our analysis.

For example, the California population of the Peninsular bighorn sheep (Ovis canadensis nelson) had its CH first
proposed in the FR on 7/5/2000 (USDOIFWS 2000) and had this proposed CH finalized in the FR on 2/1/2001
(USDOIFWS 2001). However, on 8/26/2008 the FWS proposed reducing the population’s CH area by approximately
189,377 ha (USDOIFWS 2008). This proposed change was finalized on 4/14/2009 (USDOIFWS 2009).
7
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The attentive reader will notice we have not yet defined which sales took place near a
CH, the definition of our control sales. In one case, all sales within 5 km of a CH, before and
after CH establishment, are near sales (we experiment with this buffer size in our robustness
checks). In an alternative approach, we considered sales that best matched treated sales in the
nearby CH, before and after CH establishment, as near sales. The algorithm we used to find a
CH’s matched control set went thusly (Text S1). First, we counted the number of eligible control
sales in each CH area’s 5 km buffer. If this number was 5 times or more than the number of
sales in the CH (before and after treatment), then we used a Mahalanobis matching algorithm
to match two eligible buffer sales to each sale within the CH area. For example, if a CH
contained 1,000 sales eligible for inclusion in our dataset, some before and some after
treatment, then the matched set for that CH included 2,000 of the at least 5,000 eligible control
sales, some before and some after treatment, from the CH’s 5 km buffer. For a few CH
polygons, the 5-km buffer count of eligible untreated sales did not meet the 5-fold threshold. In
these cases, the set of potential matches included the CH polygon’s entire county and, if the
number of potential matches was still short of the threshold after including untreated sales
from the entire county, adjacent counties (Text S2).
Please note that our definition of nearby means our hypothesis testing will not capture
any economic impacts of CH establishment that extend beyond the CH area and its buffer. For
example, housing prices could rise in the region that hosts a CH because of (anticipated)
reductions in regional housing supply due to CH regulations (Sunding et al. 2003, Kiel 2005).
Given that most CHs and their 5 km buffers make up a small part of a regional housing market,
this market price adjustment would cover the CH, its buffer, and area beyond. In other words,
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an empirical analysis based on our definition of nearby non-CH areas can identify any price
premium among home buyers to live within a CH area versus immediately outside the CH area,
all else equal, but will not be able to identify the more geographically widespread price impacts
of any anticipated reduction in the region’s future housing supply.
Finally, we prefer model estimates that use matched controls rather than unmatched
controls because the matched set reduces potential confounding in our DD estimator (see
Ferraro and Miranda 2017, Daw and Hatfield 2018, Melstrom 2021) and the impact of any
omitted variable bias in our DD coefficient estimates. On the cofounding front, by matching
treated sales with control sales we reduce the possibility that differences in confounding
variables caused the variation in outcomes between treated and control sales given that, on
average, cofounding variables values will be the same for both group of sales. Further,
matching also reduces the impact of potential omitted variable bias in our DD estimator. The
FWS can take CH’s expected economic ramifications into account when making boundary
decisions. Therefore, estimates of our DD model could suffer from omitted variable bias if the
FWS uses parcel values or a parcel value-explaining variable omitted from our DD model to help
decide which parcels to include in CHs. 8 In our case, by finding sales in the buffer similar to
those sales in the CH we are more likely to exclude control properties that were excluded from
CH treatment because they were so different than the typical parcel in the CH area. In other
words, due to matching, the omitted variable that explains CH exemption will tend to have the

Other forms of bias can affect the DD estimator when we use unmatched controls. For example, suppose we
limited our analysis to stream-based CHs. We assume stream-front parcels are more expensive than nearby parcels
not on the stream, all else equal, as homeowners are generally willing to pay more for waterfront parcels.
Therefore, a control set that includes sales of parcels that are not located on the steam could lead to a biased
model DD estimator as the treated set and control set are made up of fundamentally different goods. However, if
we build a matched control set
8
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same value across treated and control sales after CH establishment, and therefore cannot be
the reason for any treatment effect. Variables described in the Data section provide the
cofounders for the matching analysis as they explain parcel value and are likely to help explain
treatment assignment as well (Text S2).
See Table S1 for the universe of simple CHs and the subset of simple CHs with one or
more parcel sale in our dataset. The various exclusions noted above determined the subset of
simple CHs with one or more eligible parcel sale. Notice that are matching procedure means
that some CHs with eligible unmatched control sales have no eligible matched control sales.
Therefore, our DD model estimates with matched controls span fewer CHs and parcel sales
than our DD model estimates with unmatched controls.

4.b. Treatment timing
Treated and control sales associated with CH k that occurred before the date of k’s
proposal in the FR were pre-treatment sales. Treated and control sales associated with CH k
that occurred after the date of k’s finalization in the FR were post-treatment sales. Under this
“fuzzy” DD analysis, we ignored sales that occurred between CH proposal and finalization
dates.9 We ignored these sales because it was not clear how developers, landowners, and
homeowners would behave in this period of uncertainty. If developers were keen to develop
parcels in the proposed CH area before regulatory finalization, then the sudden imposition of a

On average, the fuzzy period is 501.2 days (SD = 343.9 days, median = 389 days, n = 61 CHs) for “simple” CHs with
treated and matched control developed parcel sales. On average, the fuzzy period is 503.9 days (SD = 341.0 days,
median = 375 days, n = 70 CHs) for “simple” CHs with treated and matched control undeveloped parcel sales. See
Table S1.

9
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deadline could cause a rush to buy undeveloped parcels and develop quickly. This race could
cause a temporary spike in the area’s undeveloped parcel prices. On the other hand,
landowners in proposed areas looking to sell undeveloped parcels before boundary finalization
might have felt pressure to take the first offer they received, not matter how low, given the
impending regulations. Further, uncertainty in future regulatory status could affect area
housing sales in unpredictable ways as well. The theoretical implications of CH regulations on
land and housing values after finalization of CH are much clearer.

4.c. National-level versus sub-national analyses
When we estimate our DD model over all eligible sales from across the US – the
national-level analysis – we are assuming the impact of CH on parcel values does not differ
according to the species that is the cause of CH regulations. However, there are various reasons
to suspect that one group of CHs will create different parcel value impacts than another group
of CHs even after we control for parcel characteristics and times of sales. For example,
regulators might enforce CH regulations more strictly for species they perceive as more popular
or that are more sensitive to changes in their habitat. In such cases, we would expect the
economic impact of treatment to be more severe than in an average case. On the other hand,
regulators may be less inclined to strictly regulate in CHs where the economic impact of
regulation could be very high, the species is not well known, the CH area is very large relative to
the amount of actual habitat in the area, or the species can easily navigate pockets of habitat
destruction. In such cases, we would expect the economic impact of treatment to be less severe
than in an average case. Further, some state land use regulators may be more inclined to use
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CH as a guide for the imposition of additional state-level regulations. For example, the
California Environmental Quality Act requires state-level scrutiny of proposed projects in CH
areas (Auffhammer et al. 2020).
Moreover, there are two distinct CH shapes, and we suspect that the economic impact
of CH will differ significantly across these two classes of CH shape. One class of CH shapes are
those that follow the contours of streams and coastlines. These CHs, typically designed for
listed fish, clams, and snails, will only affect stream- or coastal-front parcels. The other class of
CH shapes, those that follow the contours of terrestrial features, are more likely to affect a
wider variety of parcels.
Finally, we suspect the impact of CH on parcel values for some individual CHs can vary
dramatically from the average impact across all CHs. For example, a CH that covers an
idiosyncratic landscape may engender very different economic impacts than the average or
representative CH.
To examine whether these different sets of CHs generate different economic impacts
we also estimate our DD model across these subsets of treated sales and their nearby control
sales. Specifically, we estimate our DD model over all eligible sales exclusively from California,
riparian species CHs, plant CHs, amphibian CHs, and terrestrial animal CHs (mammals, birds,
and reptiles). Finally, we estimate our economic model for sales treated by a single CH,
including the Jaguar, the Gunnison sage-grouse, and the Atlantic salmon. In these cases, we are
examining whether treatment effect differs across the idiosyncratic landscapes each of these
CHs cover. We chose these individual CHs because the number of 2000 to 2019 treated and
related control sales in each case was large enough to generate estimates of our DD model.
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4.d. DD models
We use the DD estimator in a pooled two-way fixed effects (FE) OLS model and again in
a panel data model to measure the impact of CH on undeveloped or developed parcel prices.
The pooled two-way FE OLS (“pooled OLS”) model,
𝑉𝑉𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 = 𝜑𝜑𝑗𝑗∈𝑐𝑐 𝜎𝜎𝑡𝑡 + �𝛃𝛃𝑗𝑗∈𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 𝐗𝐗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 + 𝛄𝛄𝑗𝑗∈𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 𝐙𝐙𝑗𝑗 �

+ 𝛿𝛿𝟏𝟏[𝑇𝑇]𝑗𝑗 + 𝜃𝜃𝟏𝟏[𝐴𝐴]𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 + 𝜇𝜇𝟏𝟏[𝑇𝑇]𝑗𝑗 𝟏𝟏[𝐴𝐴]𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 + 𝜖𝜖𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗

(1)

uses the log of the per hectare real sale price of parcel j sold on date t (2019 USD) as the
dependent variable. The first explanatory term, 𝜑𝜑𝑗𝑗∈𝑐𝑐 𝜎𝜎𝑡𝑡 , is a county – year indicator that fixes

the county and year of each sale. The term βj∈rtXjt + γj∈rtZj is the hedonic price function. In some
cases, there is one hedonic function for all sales in an estimate of the pooled OLS model. In
other cases, all variables in Xjt and Zj are pre-multiplied by region r – year t dummies (r can
index US Census Divisions or counties). In these latter cases, βj∈rtXjt + γj∈rtZj controls for
idiosyncratic real estate market conditions across regions r and years t (Bishop et al. 2020) by
estimating a hedonic price function for each unique r – t combination. The indicator variable
1[T]j indicates if parcel j is in an area that became CH sometime between 2000 and 2019. For
treated sales of j, 1[A]jt indicates if the sale of j at time t occurred after the establishment of the
CH that houses j and for control sales of j, the variable 1[A]jt indicates if the sale of j at time t
occurred after the establishment of the CH that j is near.
The vector Xjt contains variables on parcel j’s housing characteristics at the time of the
house’s last know modification, including the number of rooms, the number of baths, the gross
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area of the house and related buildings, and the age of the structure in sale year t. The vector
Xjt is empty when we estimate the pooled OLS model over undeveloped parcel sales. The vector
Zj contains variables on parcel j’s land characteristics including its area in hectares, its average
slope, its average elevation, whether it has lake frontage or not, and its percentage of area in
wetlands as of 2018. The vector Zj contains also contains information on land characteristics
near parcel j, including the percentage of area within 2.5 km of the parcel that is in coastal
waters, the percentage of the area within a 1 km of the parcel that was protected as of 2010,
the percentage of area within 5 km of the parcel that was built-up as of circa 2012, the travel
time from the parcel to the nearest major city by car as of 2000, the distance between the
parcel and the closest highway as of 2019, and the distance between the parcel and the nearest
paved road as of 2019.
Finally, 𝜇𝜇, the coefficient on 1[T]j1[A]jt, measures the average impact of CH on the sale

price of treated developed or undeveloped parcels, whatever the case may be, relative to price
trends on control parcels where all sales, treated and control, are subject to larger ESA
regulations. Specifically,
(𝐸𝐸[𝑉𝑉|𝐗𝐗, 𝐙𝐙, 𝟏𝟏[𝐴𝐴] = 1, 𝟏𝟏[𝑇𝑇] = 1] − 𝐸𝐸[𝑉𝑉|𝐗𝐗, 𝐙𝐙, 𝟏𝟏[𝐴𝐴] = 0, 𝟏𝟏[𝑇𝑇] = 1])
𝜇𝜇̂ = �����������������������������������������
Impact of treatment on treated

− (𝐸𝐸[𝑉𝑉|𝐗𝐗,
𝐙𝐙, 𝟏𝟏[𝐴𝐴] = 1, 𝟏𝟏[𝑇𝑇] = 0] − 𝐸𝐸[𝑉𝑉|𝐗𝐗, 𝐙𝐙, 𝟏𝟏[𝐴𝐴] = 0, 𝟏𝟏[𝑇𝑇] = 0])
�����������������������������������������

(2)

Impact of treatment on control

Under various assumptions, 𝜇𝜇̂ is the unbiased estimator of the Average Treatment Effect on the

Treated (ATT),

𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 = 𝐸𝐸[𝑉𝑉|𝐗𝐗, 𝐙𝐙, 𝟏𝟏[𝐴𝐴] = 1, 𝟏𝟏[𝑇𝑇] = 1] − �������������������������
𝐸𝐸[𝑉𝑉|𝐗𝐗, 𝐙𝐙, 𝟏𝟏[𝐴𝐴] = 1, 𝟏𝟏[𝑇𝑇] = 1, 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶] (3)
Counterfactual
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where the second term of (3) is the unobserved counterfactual of CH never being applied to an
area on the landscape that was actually treated. In other words, ATT measures the average
impact that CH had on the value of a treated parcel relative to a counterfactual where it was
never treated (but still subject to larger ESA regulations). We discuss the various assumptions
that need to hold for 𝜇𝜇̂ to be the unbiased estimator of ATT, including the parallel trend
assumption, in Text S2.

In the pooled OLS model we do not explicitly link multiple sales that took place on the
same parcel (that is why model (1) is “pooled”). However, we could re-write (1) so multiple
sales from the same parcel are explicitly linked. This panel version of the pooled OLS model is
only estimated over treated and control parcels j that sold at least twice.
𝑉𝑉𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 = 𝜌𝜌𝑗𝑗 + 𝜑𝜑𝑗𝑗∈𝑐𝑐 𝜎𝜎𝑡𝑡 + 𝜔𝜔𝟏𝟏[𝑇𝑇]𝑗𝑗 𝟏𝟏[𝐴𝐴]𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 + 𝜖𝜖𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗

(4)

where ρj is the parcel fixed-effect, 𝜑𝜑𝑗𝑗∈𝑐𝑐 𝜎𝜎𝑡𝑡 is the region c – year t fixed effect, and ω is the DD

panel estimator. In the panel model the term 𝜌𝜌𝑗𝑗 + 𝜑𝜑𝑗𝑗∈𝑐𝑐 𝜎𝜎𝑡𝑡 controls for all time-invariant parcel-

level characteristics, local land market conditions, and market conditions over time. Again, the
DD panel estimator measures the average impact of CH on the sale price of treated developed
or undeveloped parcels, whatever the case may be, relative to price trends on control parcels.

As before, 𝜔𝜔
� is the unbiased estimator of the ATT as long as various assumptions are met (Text

S2).

Addressing potential omitted variable bias in the pooled OLS model was our primary
motivation for estimating a panel DD model (Kolstad and Moore 2020). The panel model may
inspire more confidence in the causal interpretation of the DD coefficient then the pooled OLS
model because all time-invariant parcel-level variables, including those that were omitted in
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the pooled OLS model, and therefore may be sources of bias in the pooled OLS model DD
coefficients, are controlled for. However, we do not view the panel model as a replacement for
the pooled OLS model, rather as a complement. Compared to the panel model, the pooled OLS
model has several superior features. First, we can estimate the pooled OLS model over a more
expansive set of observations than we can with the panel model. Second, we can use the
pooled OLS model to test whether our sales data is consistent with hedonic price theory as it
contains variables that explains parcel j’s characteristics.

5. Results
5.a. National-level estimates of pooled two-way FE OLS model
In the first set of the pooled OLS model estimates we used all treated sales and their
relevant controls in our dataset (i.e., national-level estimates; see Figures S1 and S2). We added
estimation modifications one-by-one from a base of no modifications (Table 1, (1)) to gauge the
marginal impact of each modification on the estimated DD coefficient 𝜇𝜇̂ . In the first estimation
modification we used US Census Division – year specific hedonic price functions instead of a
national-level, time invariant hedonic price function (Table 1, (2)). Next, we reverted to a
national-level, time invariant hedonic price function but used matched control sales only (Table
1, (3)). Last, we used the combination of census division – year specific hedonic price functions
and matched control sales only (Table 1, (4)). (Also see the collection of DD estimates under
“Pooled OLS (model (1))” in Figure 1.)

Table 1. Estimates of the pooled two-way FE OLS model’s DD coefficient 𝝁𝝁
� across all CHs
(national-level analysis)
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Developed sales
N of sales
N of CHs
Undeveloped sales
N of sales
N of CHs
Matched controls
Region-year hedonics

(1)
-0.0806
(0.0665)
1,662,017
94
-0.1058
(0.1019)
303,769
109
No
No

(2)
-0.0894*
(0.0486)
1,662,017
94
0.0309
(0.0615)
303,769
109
No
Yes

(3)
(4)
-0.0217
0.0012
(0.0363)
(0.0336)
88,199
88,199
61
61
0.0074
0.0727
(0.0741)
(0.0512)
34,390
34,390
70
70
Yes
Yes
No
Yes

Notes: The buffer around CH polygons is 5 KM. We used a fuzzy DD for all estimates of the pooled two-way FE OLS model
where the fuzzy period begins at CH proposal and ends at CH finalization. We clustered standard errors at the CH level (parcels
that are part of a CH or that CH’s buffer form a cluster). Region in this case refers to US Census Division. See Table S2 for
descriptive statistics.

A. National-level developed sales

B. National-level undeveloped sales

Figure 1. Estimates of the pooled two-way FE OLS and panel model’s DD coefficients
(± SE x 1.96) across all CHs (national-level analysis). Region in this case refers to US
Census Division.
When there are no estimation modifications, national-level estimates of the pooled OLS
model support neither of our hypotheses: all else equal, CH treatment did not have a
statistically significant impact on developed or undeveloped parcel prices. Alternatively, when
we used census division – year specific hedonic functions instead of the national level, timePage 25 of 73

invariant hedonic function, we found that treated developed parcels across the continental US
in ESA species range space were, on average, 8.6% less valuable than they would have been if
spared CH treatment.10 We expected CH to have a positive impact on developed parcel prices.
However, estimates of the pooled OLS model at the national level with matched control sales
suggest that CH treatment did not have a statistically significant impact on developed and
undeveloped parcel prices, no matter the structure of the hedonic functions. Given that
matched controls can mitigate the impact of cofounding and omitted variable bias in causal
estimates and Census division – year specific hedonic functions can capture some of the
idiosyncratic real estate market conditions across regions and years we put the most weight on
the results in Table 1, (4).
Plots of the average of log�𝑉𝑉𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 � against treatment timing across all treated and matched

control sales (sales used for the pooled OLS model estimates summarized in Table 1, (3)-(4))
support the conclusion that, at least at the national-level, CH treatment had little impact on

parcel prices relative to the nearby control sales. As Figure 2A indicates, the parallel trend in
national-level treated and control developed ����������
log�𝑉𝑉𝚥𝚥𝚥𝚥 � before treatment was maintained for six

years following treatment. We see a similar pattern for the relative difference between

national-level treated and matched control undeveloped ����������
log�𝑉𝑉𝚥𝚥𝚥𝚥 � pre- and post-treatment

(Figure 2B). Parallel trends in the dependent variable prior to treatment is necessary for 𝜇𝜇̂ to be
considered an unbiased estimator of ATT (Text S2).

Because Vjt is the log of the per-hectare real sale price, the impact of a change in 1[T]j1[A]jt is, on average, a
100[eμ-1]% change in V (in 2019 USD), all else equal.
10
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Across both parcel sale types, national-level treated and matched control ����������
log�𝑉𝑉𝚥𝚥𝚥𝚥 � fell

significantly just before CH proposal (indicate by the x-axis value of 0). Recall we do not use any
sales that occurred between CH proposal and finalization. Therefore, at x = 0 the statistic
����������� is almost entirely made up of sales that occurred just before CH proposal (the CH
log�𝑉𝑉
𝚥𝚥𝚥𝚥

process, from proposal to finalization, usually takes at least 300 days; therefore, the first post-

treatment sale does not typically occur until x = 1). These dips in ����������
log�𝑉𝑉𝚥𝚥𝚥𝚥 � at x = 0 could indicate
that rumors of an impending CH regulatory process temporarily depress prices in the affected

landscape. (The potential for anticipatory effects in the CH process needs to be looked in future
research.) In the end, however, ����������
log�𝑉𝑉𝚥𝚥𝚥𝚥 � for both treated and matched control developed and

undeveloped sales quickly rebounded past pre-treatment levels after CH establishment.

A. National-level developed sales

B. National-level undeveloped sales

Figure 2. Mean of log of price per ha (lines are ±1 SD) by years before or since CH
establishment. The x-axis gives years before or after treatment and the y-axis gives the average
of log�𝑉𝑉𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 �. Only matched control sales are included in these averages. A. Treated sales before
treatment period: 17381. Treated sales after treatment period: 13547. Untreated sales before
treatment period: 35344. Untreated sales after treatment period: 27355. B. Treated sales
before treatment period: 6351. Treated sales after treatment period: 6218. Untreated sales
before treatment period: 12534. Untreated sales after treatment period: 13044.
5.b. Subnational-level estimates of pooled two-way FE OLS model
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At the individual CH-level we also found little evidence to support our CH-parcel value
hypotheses (Table 2, Panel A; also see Figures S3-S5). Of the six individual CH – parcel sale type
combination estimates of the pooled OLS model (matched controls only), just the Atlantic
salmon CH process affected developed parcel values in a statically significant manner (albeit in
a direction inconsistent with our hypothesis). Specifically, we found that treated developed
parcels in the Atlantic salmon CH and in ESA species range space were, on average, 34.9% less
valuable than they would have been if spared CH treatment. Limited pre-treatment developed
parcel sales in the Atlantic salmon CH mean the statistically significant treatment effect is hard
to see on its event study plot (Figure S6).
However, we are not sure how much stock to put in the Panel A estimates of 𝜇𝜇. The

����������� indicate that these DD analyses do not satisfy the pre-treatment
individual CH plots of log�𝑉𝑉
𝚥𝚥𝚥𝚥
parallel trends assumption (Figures S6-S8), suggesting that the estimates of the ATT for the
individual CHs are biased. Given FWS’s documented efforts to exempt some “developable”
vacant parcels from CH regulation that would likely otherwise generate an adverse modification
finding when proposed for development (Fosburgh 2022), we believe the 𝜇𝜇̂ associated with

individual CH undeveloped parcel sales are biased upwards (Text S2). We are not sure of the
direction in bias in the 𝜇𝜇̂ associated with individual CH developed parcel sales.
Table 2. Estimates of the pooled two-way FE OLS model DD coefficient 𝝁𝝁
� across different
subsets of CHs
CH set
Panel A
Jaguar
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(1)
Developed
sales

(2)
Developed
sales

(3)
(4)
Undeveloped Undeveloped
sales
sales

0.0382
(0.1194)

NA

-0.4155
(0.2767)

NA

Gunnison sage-grouse
Atlantic salmon
Panel B
Amphibians

Terrestrial animals

Flowering plants

Riparian species

Matched controls
Region-year hedonics

N of sales
N of sales
N of sales

N of sales
N of CHs
N of sales
N of CHs
N of sales
N of CHs
N of sales
N of CHs

-0.094
(0.1535)

712

NA

833
-0.4298** NA
(0.1812)
4017

-0.277
(0.2797)
0.1762
(0.3498)

302
575

NA
NA

539

0.0522
-0.0625
0.4408
(0.0925)
(0.1329)
(0.4750)
4534
4532
1920
8
8
9
-0.0628*** -0.0334***
-0.0924**
(0.0045)
(0.0032)
(0.0366)
61550
61550
19566
5
5
6
-0.0737
0.882***
-0.2338***
(0.1028)
(0.2329)
(0.0744)
728
728
647
17
17
21
0.0846
0.0842
0.1700
(0.0668)
(0.0661)
(0.1454)
25915
25915
14126
38
38
41
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No

0.6626
(0.8389)

1920
9
0.0331***
(0.0045)
19566
6
0.0251
(0.015)
647
21
0.1269
(0.1306)
14126
41
Yes
Yes

Notes: The buffer around CH polygons is 5 KM. We used a fuzzy DD for all estimates of the pooled OLS model where the fuzzy
period begins at CH proposal and ends at CH finalization. See Table S2 for some descriptive statistics. Panel A Notes: We do not
use region–year specific hedonic functions when estimating model (1) because an individual CH covers just one region. Further,
the term 𝜑𝜑𝑗𝑗∈𝑐𝑐 𝜎𝜎𝑡𝑡 accounts for any temporal changes in the region’s land market conditions. Panel B Notes: We clustered
standard errors at the CH level (parcels that are part of a CH or that CH’s buffer form a cluster). Terrestrial animals are
mammals, birds, and reptiles. Riparian species are amphibians, clams, fishes, and snails. Region in this case refers to US
counites except in the case of riparian CHs. In the riparian case region refers to US Census Division. The pooled OLS model could
not be estimated over riparian CH treated and control sales with county–year specific hedonic functions because of rank-order
issues. See Table S2 for descriptive statistics.

A. Developed sales
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B. Undeveloped sales

Figure 3. Estimates of the pooled two-way FE OLS and panel model’s DD coefficients (± SE x
1.96) across all CHs (national-level analysis). Region in this case refers to US counites except in
the case of riparian CHs. In that case region refers to US Census Division.

In contrast to the unexpected 𝜇𝜇̂ values across individual CHs, estimates of 𝜇𝜇 over sales

grouped by taxonomy or CH shape type provide some empirical support for our hypothesis that
the CH regulation depresses undeveloped parcel values. Specifically, when using one timeinvariant hedonic function, treated undeveloped parcels across terrestrial animal and plant CHs
were, on average, 8.8% and 20.8% less valuable, respectively, than they would have been if
spared CH treatment (but not general ESA treatment) (Table 2, (3)). Further, in support of our
second hypothesis, developed properties in plant CHs did become more valuable relative to
their nearby, unregulated counterparts when using our preferred hedonic price modeling
technique, region-year specific hedonic functions.
However, we also found results contrary to our hypotheses. For example, we found that
developed parcel sales in terrestrial animal CHs were 6.1% less valuable than they would have
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been if spared CH treatment (but not general ESA treatment) when using one time-invariant
hedonic function (Table 2, (1)). Further, evidence that CH regulation depressed undeveloped
parcel values disappeared when we used region-year specific hedonic functions to estimate 𝜇𝜇

over sales grouped by taxonomy or CH shape type (Table 2, (4)).

The parallel pre-trend assumption for treated and controlled ����������
log�𝑉𝑉𝚥𝚥𝚥𝚥 � appears to hold

for the 𝜇𝜇̂ 's associated with amphibian, terrestrial animal, and riparian species CHs. However,

this necessary condition for an unbiased estimate of the ATT does not hold for plant CHs (see
Figures S9-S12). As before, we believe 𝜇𝜇̂ associated with undeveloped parcel sales are biased
upwards when the parallel pre-trend assumption is not met (Text S2).

5.c. California-only estimates of pooled two-way FE OLS model
When using matched control sales and a state-wide, time invariant hedonic price
function, we found the economic impact of California CH on developed parcel value was
consistent with our expectations. Specifically, developed parcels in California CHs and California
amphibian CHs only were, on average, 20.4% and 14.9% more valuable, respectively, than they
would have been if spared CH treatment (but not ESA treatment in general) (Table 3, (1) and
(4); Figure 4). However, given that region-year specific hedonic functions can capture some of
the idiosyncratic real estate market conditions across the state over time we emphasize the
results in columns (3) and (5) of Table 3 (matched controls and county-year specific hedonic
functions across all California CHs). Using this preferred model permutation, we found that CH
did not have a statistically significant impact on developed parcel prices in California.
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The estimated impact of California CH on undeveloped land prices never conformed
with our expectations. Across all model permutations, California CH either had no statistically
significant effect on undeveloped parcel prices or, contrary to our expectations, positively
affected undeveloped parcel price. We found this latter impact when using matched control
sales and a state-wide, time invariant hedonic price function in California amphibian CHs. In this
case, undeveloped parcels in California amphibian CHs were, on average, 51.0% more
expensive than they would have been if spared CH treatment (but not ESA treatment in
general).
����������� – for all CHs and just amphibian CHs – against
Finally, plots of California log�𝑉𝑉
𝚥𝚥𝚥𝚥

treatment timing suggest the parallel trend assumption for unbiased estimates of the ATT in
California are met (Figures S13-S14).
Table 3. Estimates of the pooled two-way FE OLS model’s DD coefficient 𝝁𝝁
� in California CH
(1)
CHs
All
Developed sales
0.1858**
(0.0926)
N of sales
4087
N of CHs
13
Undeveloped sales
0.4350
(0.5280)
N of sales
3630
N of CHs
15
Matched controls
Yes
Region-year hedonics No

(2)
All
0.0687
(0.0909)
449590

(3)
All
0.0578
(0.1342)
4087
13
13
0.1848
0.6285
(0.3858)
(0.7890)
26163
3630
15
15
No
Yes
Yes
Yes

(4)
Amphibians
0.1391***
(0.0439)
1744
3
0.4123***
(0.1323)
1659
4
Yes
No

(5)
Amphibians
0.0522
(0.1529)
1744
3
__

Yes
Yes

1659
4

Notes: The buffer around CH polygons is 5 KM. We used a fuzzy DD for all estimates of the pooled two-way FE OLS model
where the fuzzy period begins at CH proposal and ends at CH finalization. We clustered standard errors at the CH level (parcels
that are part of a CH or that CH’s buffer form a cluster) in the columns (1) – (3) estimates. Region in this case refers to counties.
There are 58 counites in California. Rank-order issues prevented estimation of DD coefficient for California amphibians over
undeveloped parcel sales when county-year specific hedonic functions were used.
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Figure 4. Estimates of the pooled two-way FE OLS and panel model’s DD coefficients (± SE x
1.96) across all California CHs. Region in this case refers to counites.

5.d. Hedonic price function sanity checks
The pooled OLS is a hedonic price model with DD controls. Therefore, if the signs on Xjt
and Zj’s estimated coefficients are consistent with the larger hedonic price model literature
then we have further evidence that the pooled OLS model is correctly specified. According to
past hedonic price model research parcels nearer urban amenities (Ardeshiri et al. 2018),
transportation networks (Seo et al. 2014), water (e.g., Dahal et al. 2019), and protected areas
(e.g., Kling et al. 2015) are more valuable, all else equal, than parcels further from these
landscape features. Further, parcels higher in elevation (e.g., Wu et al. 2004, Sander et al. 2010)
but on flat land are more valuable than low laying land that is slopped (e.g., Ma and Swinton
2012), all else equal. Finally, structures that are larger, have more rooms, more bathrooms, and
are newer are more valued than smaller and older structures, all else equal (e.g., Morancho
2003, Sander and Polasky 2009).
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Table 4. Fraction of estimated hedonic price function explanatory variable coefficients that
are of expected sign in estimates of pooled two-way FE OLS model across all CHs (nationallevel estimates), CH subsets, and California CH. Cells are shaded green if more that 50% of the
coefficient estimates conform to the expected sign.
Zj (expected coefficient sign)
Lake frontage
Elevation
Size of parcel
Slope
Travel time to major cities
Minimum distance to highway
Minimum distance to paved road
% building footprint w/in 5 km radius
% coast w/in 2.5 km radius
% protected w/in 1 km radius
Proportion of parcel that is in wetland
Xjt (expected coefficient sign)
Number of rooms
Number of baths
Building Year
Building gross area
Matched controls
Census division-year hedonics
County-year hedonics

(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
Developed sales
Undeveloped sales
+
+
+
+
+
+
+

0.889
0.900
0.900
0.300
0.900
0.400
0.300
0.600
0.857
0.400
0.900

0.756
0.544
0.690
0.434
0.596
0.357
0.397
0.541
0.771
0.429
0.662

0.666
0.472
0.733
0.393
0.587
0.487
0.463
0.497
0.775
0.467
0.606

0.750
1.000
1.000
0.889
1.000
0.333
0.667
0.889
0.500
0.222
0.333

+
+
+

0.800
1.000
1.000
1.000
Yes
No
No

0.593
0.887
0.879
0.884
Yes
Yes
No

0.557
0.723
0.728
0.801
Yes Yes
No No
Yes No

0.667
0.518
0.838
0.606
0.662
0.466
0.455
0.669
0.686
0.475
0.434

0.560
0.459
0.749
0.477
0.612
0.429
0.514
0.625
0.695
0.513
0.458

Yes
Yes
No

Yes
No
Yes

Notes: In columns (3) and (6) we include the Xjt and Zj’s estimated coefficients from estimates of (1) over riparian CHs where we
used census division-year hedonics and matched controls. The pooled OLS model could not be estimated over riparian CH
treated and control sales with county–year specific hedonic functions because of rank-order issues.

In Table 4 we indicate the fraction of times an estimated pooled OLS model coefficient
on a parcel or structural variable had the expected sign. Columns (1) and (4) pool all the Xjt and
Zj’s estimated coefficients from the pooled OLS model where we used a single, time invariant
hedonic price function and matched controls (Table 1, (3); Table 2, (1); Table 3, (1) and (4)).
Columns (2) and (5) pool all the Xjt and Zj’s estimated coefficients from estimates of the pooled
OLS model where we used census division-year hedonics and matched controls (Table 1, (4)).
Finally, columns (3) and (6) pool all the Xjt and Zj’s estimated coefficients from estimates of the
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pooled OLS model where we used county-year hedonics and matched controls (Table 2, (2) and
(4) and Table 3, (3) and (5)).
According to our analysis, the structural variables in vector Xjt very frequently shifted
developed parcel prices in ways that aligned with expectations. Further, the land characteristic
variables lake frontage, elevation, parcel size, travel time to nearest major city, nearby building
footprint, and proximity to coastline more often than not shifted both developed and
undeveloped parcel prices in expected ways. These results suggest that the pooled OLS model is
properly specified.

5.e. Estimates of panel model
In Panel A of Table 5 we present the panel model’s estimated DD coefficients when
using the nation-wide panel of sales (a property had to sell at least twice for its sales to be in
the dataset). The first row in Panel B gives 𝜔𝜔
�’s when the nation-wide panel of sales is limited to
those with observations for every variable in Zj and, when applicable, Xjt. Finally, the second

row in Panel B gives 𝜇𝜇̂ ’s from estimates of the pooled OLS model using the nation-wide panel of
sales with complete observations. Therefore, the DD estimates summarized in Panel B, (1) use
the same set of sales; the DD estimates summarized in Panel B, (2) use the same set of sales;
etc. (also see Figure 1 for plots of 𝜔𝜔
� from Table 5, (2) and (4)).
� across all CHs (national-level
Table 5. Estimates of the panel model’s DD coefficient 𝝎𝝎
analysis)

Panel A
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(1)
(2)
Developed Developed
sales
sales

(3)
Undeveloped
sales

(4)
Undeveloped
sales

-0.0127
0.0000
(0.0283)
(0.0223)
N of sales 1,446,448
62,207
N of CHs
87
45
Panel B - complete observations only
-0.0013
0.0166
Panel mode
(0.0333)
(0.032)
N of sales 1,023,719
42,826
N of CHs
82
41

-0.0051
(0.02)

-0.0413
(0.0822)
164,670
20,919
82
49

0.0029
(0.0223)

0.0024
(0.0411)
140,990
16,506
80
48

Estimates of 𝜇𝜇̂ from pooled
two-way FE OLS model
N of sales
N of CHs
Matched controls
Region-time hedonics

-0.0903
(0.0611)

0.1076**
(0.0504)
140,990
16,506
80
48
Yes
No

Panel model

-0.1030**
(0.0487)
1,023,719
82
No
No

0.0077
(0.0312)
42,826
41
Yes
No

No
No

Notes: We clustered standard errors at the CH level (parcels that are part of a CH or that CH’s buffer area form a cluster). See
Table S3 for the descriptive statistics.

All estimates of the panel model suggest that CH, at least at the national-level, had no
statistically significant effect on parcel prices no matter the type of parcel (developed or
undeveloped) and control sale type (matched or not) considered. When we compared the
estimated DD coefficients from the pooled OLS and panel models using the exact the same set
of sales (Panel B) holding model permutation constant (same column), we found that the panel
model was less likely to have found that CH had a statistically significant effect on parcel prices
than the pooled OLS model. Therefore, assuming the panel model has a stronger claim to causal
interpretation because all time-invariant parcel-level variables, including those that were
omitted in the pooled OLS model, are controlled for, we are even more confident in the
conclusion that the CH regulation, at least at the national level, has had little impact on parcel
values.

5.c. Robustness checks
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In our default analysis, control sales are based on a 5 KM buffer. We re-estimated model
(1) at the national level and across the various CH subsets using buffer sizes of 3 and 10 KM. We
found that buffer size did not affect national-level estimates of model (1) (Table S4, Figure S15).
However, alternative buffer sizes did change the statistical significance of 𝜇𝜇̂ for several CH

subsets (Table S5, Figure S16). Overall, however, we see no evidence of systematic change in 𝜇𝜇̂

as we change buffer size. For example, the number of statistically significant 𝜇𝜇̂ did not increase

or decrease in buffer size. Nor did the magnitudes of the various 𝜇𝜇̂ shift in a consistent manner

as we changed buffer size. The sensitivity of some subset CH model results to buffer size choice
reinforces our topline conclusion that the impact of CH on land prices cannot be reduced to a
simple, consistent narrative.
Recent econometric literature has discussed the possibility of biased DD estimators
when treatment timing is staggered (Goodman-Bacon 2018; de Chaisemartin and
d’Haultfoeuille 2020, Text S2). Staggered treatment bias cannot be an issue in our individual
species CH estimates (Table 2, panel A) but is a potential problem in all other model estimates.
Per Callaway and Sant’Anna (2019), we eliminate the potential of bias in the pooled OLS
model’s DD estimator due to staggered treatment by estimating the model over a cohort of CHs
that were proposed and finalized at approximately the same time (Tables S6-S8; Figure S17). To
further reduce the potential impact of unobserved policy changes affecting parcel prices in
these CHs and their relevant controls, we only included treated sales and relevant matched
control sales that occurred within two years of treatment (pre-treatment sales are not limited
by time). Again, we found these results largely failed to confirm our hypotheses. These results
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suggest that the inconsistent impact of CH on parcel values we found when using the pooled
OLS model cannot be blamed on staggered treatment bias.
Some parcels flagged as developed in our database (zoned as rural-residential with
positive building footprint) are likely to be viewed by developers as still “developable.” For
example, consider a rural-residential 80-acre parcel with one house on it. We consider this
parcel “developed” given that it has a nonzero building footprint. Suppose the conversion of
the parcel to a subdivision would generate millions of dollars in net revenues for a developer. In
this case, the “developed” parcel would be very attractive to a developer as the cost of
removing the one house would be negligible compared to the value of the parcel after
subdivision. Therefore, we experimented with dividing our developed parcels into two types:
those that we believe could generally be re-developed at little relative cost (like the fictitious
80-acre parcel described above) and those that we believe would be much costlier or
impractical to re-develop. We assume this latter category would for the most part be made up
of developed parcels where the new owners would use the parcel as is or implement marginal
changes at most.
We believe a parcel’s building to parcel area (BPR) ratio statistic provides the best
means of separating developed parcels into these two types. We assume developed parcels
with a low BPR – lower than 0.063 across all parcels categorized as ‘rural residential’ – were like
our fictitious 80-acre parcel with one house: very developable (0.063 is at the 90th percentile of
the BPR ratio distribution across all “rural Residential” parcels in our dataset). On the other
hand, we assumed parcels with BPRs greater than 0.063 were much less likely to be bought for
re-development. We found that the developed parcels with a high BPR have an estimated
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pooled OLS DD coefficient similar in magnitude to the estimated DD coefficient associated with
the entire pool of developed parcels (Table 1, (3)), albeit both estimated coefficients are not
statistically significant (Table S9). We also found that developed parcels with a low BPR have an
estimated pooled OLS DD coefficient similar in magnitude to the estimated DD coefficient
associated with undeveloped parcels (Table 1, (3)), albeit both estimated coefficients are not
statistically significant. Overall, the subdivision of developed parcels into two sets based on
building footprint does not change our assessment of national-level results.

6. Conclusion
We found that CH treatment infrequently had a statistically significant impact on parcel
values. Further, when a DD coefficient was statistically significant, the impact was often at odds
with the hypothesized direction. Finally, the scale of analysis affected our findings. Nationallevel analyses indicated little to no effect of the CH regulation on parcel values while some
more focused analyses (e.g., California amphibian CHs only or terrestrial animal CHs only) did
find some regulatory effect on land and house prices. Therefore, the impact of CH on land
prices cannot be reduced to a simple, consistent narrative. Determining why some CHs create
positive economic impacts, why others create negative economic impacts, and why others have
no apparent economic impact at all are the questions that future CH economic research must
answer.
There are multiple potential reasons why we found regulatory impacts that are at odds
with previous findings. First, across all treated and matched control sales, 95.4% of developed
and 95.3% of undeveloped parcel sales were not from California. Almost all other previous CH
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impact analyses have focused on California. For example, the DD analysis in Auffhammer et al.
(2020) used just two CHs in California. Second, we use a comprehensive, consistent, and
national-level dataset of observed parcel sales, ZTRAX, that has never been used in CH analyses
before. Third, we emphasize the DD results we obtained with a matched control set. Only a few
of the previous CH impact analyses used matched (or synthetic) controls, an approach that
many researchers have found improves causal identification. Fourth, we measured the impact
of the CH regulation on land prices, not the impact of a mixture of CH and larger ESA
regulations on land prices, by ensuring that every parcel sale in our dataset, treated or control,
occurred when the parcel was in the geographic range of at least one listed species. We are not
sure how careful previous studies of CH economic impact were at separating these regulatory
impacts.
Several reasons could explain why undeveloped land prices are for, the most part, not
affected by CH in expected ways. The most obvious explanation is that the CH rule, especially
when separated from the larger ESA regulation, does not have much regulatory bite. First,
many development projects in many CH areas may not require federal permits or use federal
monies, thereby never requiring CH consultation. Second, even in cases where the federal
nexus applies, it could be that required changes or activity delays are most often minor,
creating little effect on prices. In fact, past FWS administrators have claimed that the CH rule is
superfluous given the larger ESA regulations. 11 If this sentiment guides FWS in their application

Some USFWS administrators that CH does not add any additional protection for species and therefore CH
designation is unnecessary and merely administrative (Armstrong 2002). According to his line of argument, the
additional federal scrutiny that development activities are supposed to generate in CH areas are applied across a
listed species’ entire geographic range, not just its CH area.

11
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of CH regulations then it would not be surprising to find that the CH rule in of itself has little
economic impact.
Alternatively, undeveloped parcel prices could have fallen less than expected in CH
areas because of local land supply effects. For example, suppose some undeveloped parcels in a
CH area became “undevelopable” due to CH regulations. Further, suppose the remaining
undeveloped parcels in the CH can be developed at little additional cost or delay. In this case,
the total supply of “developable” land has fallen across the CH and its 5 KM buffer – thereby,
keeping local undeveloped parcel prices elevated – but the difference in development cost
between treated (but “developable”) and control undeveloped parcels is minor. The pattern of
average treated and control per ha undeveloped parcel prices pre- and post-treatment in Figure
1B comport with this story: notice that for five years after CH establishment both treated and
control undeveloped parcel average prices are elevated relative to their average prices before
treatment.
There are other mechanisms that may keep undeveloped land prices in CH areas higher
than expected. For example, housing developers may be willing to put up with the hassle and
uncertainty of developing land in CH areas if they believe that homeowners will be willing to
pay a premium for houses in these regulated areas. In addition, undeveloped land prices in
some CH areas could be higher than expected because of competition from conservation
organizations. If CH designation triggers conservation organizations’ attempts to buy
undeveloped land in a CH for biodiversity conservation, then the higher demand for
undeveloped land in the CH could maintain prices despite the additional regulatory scrutiny of
private development activities in the same area (Armsworth et al. 2006).
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The CH rule not having much actual regulatory bite could also explain why we did not
consistently find higher housing prices in CH areas after treatment. For example, if CH does
little to prevent development, then open spaces adjacent to homes in CH areas are just as
susceptible to development as open spaces adjacent to homes in nearby, non-CH areas. If this is
true, then homes in CH areas would not command a premium relative to homes in nonregulated areas. Finally, homebuyers might view homes right outside of a CH area – in the
buffer – as equivalent to homes inside a CH area, all else equal. Assuming CH does make the
preservation of open space more likely, homes in the buffer will be nearby unique open spaces.
For many homeowners being near unique open spaces could be just as valuable as being within
unique open spaces.
In conclusion, when using land prices as a metric of regulatory impact, the CH rule has
inconsistent and often, non-existent impacts. The CH rule is a biodiversity protection program
that – when evaluated separately from the larger ESA regulation that it is part of – only
sporadically creates the costs that theory suggests it is capable of generating. Therefore, we
wonder if the program creates much biodiversity protection at all. We assume that an effective
biodiversity protection program would consistently generate observable costs; we are skeptical
of the efficacy of a program that appears to cost little.
Of course, the CH rule could consistently create economic costs despite our claims to
the contrary. We already noted that our DD estimators are unbiased estimators of the ATT if
and only if various data and modeling assumptions hold Text S2). However, even if all of these
data and modeling assumptions held, there are other reasons to suspect that the DD estimators
generated by our models are biased. Further, there are some data problems that we cannot
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solve at this time. We detail some of the other potential sources of DD estimator bias and data
issues below to be as transparent as possible. Future research on the economic impact of CH
would be more precise if it corrects the problems we identify below. However, despite these
caveats, the general statistical insignificance of the estimated DD coefficients and the
consistent inconsistency in our results means we are confident in our assessment that, while
the impact of CH on land prices cannot be reduced to a simple, consistent narrative, the CH rule
above and beyond other ESA regulations does not generate significant economic impacts.
We have hypothesized that the consultation requirement and the possibility of a
“destruction or adverse modification finding” dampens developer demand for undeveloped
land in the CH, all else equal, and accordingly, should dampen prices for those lands, all else
equal. However, a more nuanced model of CH impact on undeveloped parcel values would
surmise that only some developable parcels would be likely to require the developer to
“implement reasonable and prudent alternatives to avoid destruction or adverse modification
of critical habitat” and therefore, only these parcels would have dampened prices. Therefore, a
critical unobserved variable in our analysis of undeveloped parcel prices in CH areas is Mjt,
parcel j’s probability of a destruction or adverse modification finding if considered for
development. And even though using matched control sales can reduce the potential of
omitted variable bias, it may not completely eliminate it. See Text S3 for a detailed discussion
on the bias that an omission of Mjt could engender in the undeveloped parcel DD estimator.
Selection bias also likely affects our DD coefficient estimates. CHs that have been
revised several times (“complex” CHs) due to new information, new scientific data, political
pressure, or court cases are not included in our study because they make identification of the
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economic impact of CH more difficult (i.e., certain parcels may pop in and out of CH rapidly).
However, we suspect that these complex CHs are likely to have had a greater impact on land
prices than the “simple” CHs that we currently include in our study (e.g., see Klick and Ruhl
2020). Presumably, their imposition of high economic cost is one of the main reasons for
“complex” CHs unsettled path to finalization (see SI Text 4). 12 Therefore, by not including the
potentially more expensive CHs, our estimates of the DD coefficients μ and ω likely
underestimate the actual penalty that CH imposes on American land values.
In addition, there are several data issues that hamper our ability to precisely identify the
impact of CH on parcel prices. First, even though we claim that “simple” CHs have consistent
boundaries between the proposal and finalization stage that is not always the case. Minor
changes can be made between these two stages. For example, in the FR that announces the
final designation of CH for Gunnison Sage-Grouse the section “[w]e modified the boundaries of
this critical habitat designation around the City of Gunnison” refers to boundaries set forth in
the proposed CH (USDOIFWS 2013, 2014). We use fuzzy DID timing in order to avoid having to
account for sales that took place on land proposed for CH and that may not be in the final CH;
in our model either a parcel was certainly regulated by CH or not. However, market participants
may not realize that land proposed for regulation was not finalized as CH. Therefore, there may
be some post-CH establishment control sales in our model estimates that were affected by the
perception of CH regulation.

Not every complex CH case is driven by economic concerns. For example, Preble’s meadow jumping mouse’s
original “final” CH area was expanded 75% due to “habitat considerations”
12
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Second, during the course of our research we learned that some of the digital maps of
CH areas available from the FWS’ website only approximate the actual CH areas (personal
communication with Maura Flight, 6/25/21). Official CH areas are described with coordinates
and printed maps in FR notices and, in some cases, the digital representation of these areas
does not exactly follow official boundaries. Therefore, our analysis likely has some false
positives (parcels that we treat as “treated” but in fact were not) and false negatives (parcels
that we treat as “not treated” but in fact were). We will investigate the impact of digital map
measurement error in future iterations of this research.
A third identification problem is created by the perceived versus actual regulatory “bite”
of the CH rule. As we argued above, our findings suggest that the CH rule adds little regulatory
bite above and beyond more general ESA regulations. This conclusion may be particularly
germane in CH areas that include occupied habitat. The destruction or modification of occupied
habitat is already prevented by ESA regulations; in these areas CH regulations are superfluous.
However, CH can also cover unoccupied habitat. In these areas the CH regulation may be
impactful because the take and jeopardy provisions of the ESA are less relevant in these
landscapes (personal communication with Maura Flight, 6/25/21). In unoccupied habitat areas
the CH regulation may be the only relevant barrier to habitat destruction or modification.
Therefore, the better DD model for investigating the impact of CH on land values may be to
treat CH areas that include unoccupied habitat as treated areas and all other ESA-affected
areas, including CH area over occupied habitat, as the control areas.
We believe that many of these data problems could be resolved if FWS tweaked the
data they make available to the public. First, FWS should publish digital maps of every proposed
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CH, every proposed revision, and every final CH, not just the latest final CH. Second, each
published CH map should specify known habitat areas, occupied habitat, and unoccupied
habitat. Third, the FR notices that describe and codify the CH making process need to become
more consistent in the data they present and the layout of the data. Tables that indicate the
breakdown of proposed and final CH area by land tenure (private, local government, tribal, etc.)
need to be in every FR notice. Further, if there has been a change in the area by land tenure
from an earlier FR notice the specific reason should be noted and not a vague reference to a
one of the ESA regulations but the specific reason. For example, a specific statement would
read “thirty hectares of private forest in the previous CH proposal were removed in the current
proposal because Weyerhaeuser has agreed to place thirty hectares of land they own in an
Habitat Conservation Plan.”
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SI Text
S1. Matching procedure (Mahalanobis distance matching)
Below are the matching procedure steps.
1.
2.
3.
4.

Collect all the sales from 42 states
Remove multiple property sales
Create variables: Create variables that we will use.
Filter out data:
a) Remove if multiple CH
b) Remove if sales before 2000
c) Remove if proposed publication date (proposed_date) before 2000
d) Remove if not ‘simple’ CH
5. Property type:
a) Residential property with building: building code is RR and building gross area is more
than 0 square feet.
b) Property without building: building gross area is not more than 0 square feet.
Matching procedure
a) Define treatment and control
i) First step is to look for control within the buffer of polygons in the county. If control
observation is less than 5 times of treatment or number of control observations is
less than 100, then we look for control in step ii.
ii) Second step is to look for control within the county. Again, we use the same criteria.
If it fulfills the rejection criteria, we go to step iii.
iii) We look for control in neighboring counties.
b) Matching algorithm:
i) Number of match (M): 2 [one to two matching]
ii) Treatment variable for matching: ‘polygon’
iii) co-variates used for matching: 'bld_n_rooms', 'bld_n_baths', 'bld_yr_combined',
'bld_gross_area', 'lake', 'ha', 'slope', 'elev', 'travel_weiss', 'rd_dist_hwy',
'rd_dist_pvd', 'p_bld_fp_5000', 'p_wet', 'cst_2500', 'p_prot_2010_1000',
'property_type'
iv) Exact variable: 'property_type'
v) Ties: TRUE
vi) Replace: FALSE
vii) Weight: 2 [Mahalanobis distance]
S2. Unbiased 𝝁𝝁
�
When we estimate (1) over one just one CH (e.g., the jaguar’s CH) or over a pool of CHs that
were all established at the same time, 𝜇𝜇̂ is the unbiased estimator of ATT when 1) conditional
parallel trends; 2) homogenous treatment effects in X,Z; 3) no X,Z-specific trends across sales
grouped according to every unique combination of 1[Treat]j and 1[After]jt; and 4) “common
support” all hold (Cunningham 2021, Angrist and Pischke 2009, Daw and Hatfield 2018).
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When we estimate (1) over a pool of CHs with different establishment dates then two more
conditions must be met for 𝜇𝜇̂ to be an unbiased estimator of ATT: 1) variance weighted parallel
trends are zero and 2) no dynamic treatment effects (Cunningham 2021).
Many of these assumptions will not hold when we estimate (1). Therefore, in all likelihood, the
various 𝜇𝜇̂ we calculate are biased ATT estimates.
S3. More DD bias issues
We already noted that our DD estimators are unbiased estimators of the ATT if and only if
various data and modeling assumptions hold. However, even in the unlikely event that all the
DD data and modeling assumptions held, there would be other reasons to suspect that the DID
estimators generated by models (1) and (4) are biased. We detail some of the other potential
sources of DID estimator bias here.
As we mentioned in the introduction, the establishment of CH boundaries is guided by the
spatial distribution of the species and known habitat. Within that area,
[w]here a landowner seeks or requests Federal agency funding or authorization for an action that
may affect a listed species or critical habitat, the consultation requirements of section 7(a)(2)
would apply, but even in the event of a destruction or adverse modification finding, the
obligation of the Federal action agency and the landowner is not to restore or recover the
species, but to implement reasonable and prudent alternatives to avoid destruction or adverse
modification of critical habitat. (p. 2542, USDOIFWS 2013)

We have hypothesized that the consultation requirement and the possibility of a “destruction
or adverse modification finding” dampens developer demand for land in the CH, all else equal,
and accordingly, dampens prices for those lands, all else equal. However, a more nuanced
model of CH impact on undeveloped parcel values would surmise that only some developable
parcels would be likely to require the developer to “implement reasonable and prudent
alternatives to avoid destruction or adverse modification of critical habitat” and that these
specific parcels would be especially undesirable relative to those “treated” parcels that were
unlikely to engender a destruction or adverse modification finding when subject to a
development plan. Therefore, a critical unobserved variable in our analysis of undeveloped
parcel prices indicates each parcel’s probability of a destruction or adverse modification finding
if considered for development. Let this probability be given by Mjt. Model (1) with this omitted
variable is,
𝑉𝑉𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 = 𝑓𝑓�𝜑𝜑, 𝜎𝜎, 𝛄𝛄, 𝐙𝐙𝑗𝑗 � + 𝛿𝛿𝟏𝟏[𝑇𝑇]𝑗𝑗 + 𝜃𝜃𝟏𝟏[𝐴𝐴]𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 + 𝜑𝜑𝟏𝟏[𝑇𝑇]𝑗𝑗 𝟏𝟏[𝐴𝐴]𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 + 𝜌𝜌𝑀𝑀𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 + 𝜖𝜖𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗

(SI 1)

If 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐�𝑀𝑀𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 , 𝟏𝟏[𝑇𝑇]𝑗𝑗 � ≠ 0 then model (1)’s μ for undeveloped parcel is a biased DD estimator of
undeveloped parcel’s “true” DD estimator 𝜑𝜑. Suppose the form of covariance between Mjt and
𝟏𝟏[𝑇𝑇]𝑗𝑗 can be represented with the equation,
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𝑀𝑀𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 = 𝑎𝑎 + 𝑏𝑏𝟏𝟏[𝑇𝑇]𝑗𝑗 + 𝑐𝑐𝟏𝟏[𝑇𝑇]𝑗𝑗 𝟏𝟏[𝐴𝐴]𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 + 𝜀𝜀𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗

(SI 2)

Then (SI 1) becomes,

𝑉𝑉𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 = 𝑓𝑓�𝜑𝜑, 𝜎𝜎, 𝛄𝛄, 𝐙𝐙𝑗𝑗 � + 𝛿𝛿𝟏𝟏[𝑇𝑇]𝑗𝑗 + 𝜃𝜃𝟏𝟏[𝐴𝐴]𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 + 𝜑𝜑𝟏𝟏[𝑇𝑇]𝑗𝑗 𝟏𝟏[𝐴𝐴]𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 +

(SI 3)

= 𝑓𝑓�𝜑𝜑, 𝜎𝜎, 𝛄𝛄, 𝐙𝐙𝑗𝑗 � + 𝜌𝜌𝜌𝜌 + (𝜌𝜌𝜌𝜌 + 𝛿𝛿)𝟏𝟏[𝑇𝑇]𝑗𝑗 + 𝜃𝜃𝟏𝟏[𝐴𝐴]𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 +

(SI 4)

𝜌𝜌�𝑎𝑎 + 𝑏𝑏𝟏𝟏[𝑇𝑇]𝑗𝑗 + 𝑐𝑐𝟏𝟏[𝑇𝑇]𝑗𝑗 𝟏𝟏[𝐴𝐴]𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 + 𝜀𝜀𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 � + 𝜖𝜖𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗
(𝜌𝜌𝜌𝜌 + 𝜑𝜑)𝟏𝟏[𝑇𝑇]𝑗𝑗 𝟏𝟏[𝐴𝐴]𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 + �𝜌𝜌𝜀𝜀𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 + 𝜖𝜖𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 �

Therefore, model (1)’s 𝜇𝜇̂ is an estimate of 𝜌𝜌𝜌𝜌 + 𝜑𝜑 when 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐�𝑀𝑀𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 , 𝟏𝟏[𝑇𝑇]𝑗𝑗 � ≠ 0. If we assume,
•

•

that the value of an undeveloped parcel declines as the likelihood of a destruction or
adverse modification finding on the parcel increases, all else equal (ρ < 0); and
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐�𝑀𝑀𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 , 𝟏𝟏[𝑇𝑇]𝑗𝑗 � < 0 given FWS’ documented efforts to exempt some developable
parcels from CH regulation that are likely to otherwise have a destruction or adverse
modification finding (c < 0)

then 𝜇𝜇̂ will be larger than the “true” DD coefficient 𝜑𝜑 when 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐�𝑀𝑀𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 , 𝟏𝟏[𝑇𝑇]𝑗𝑗 � ≠ 0. For example,
if 𝜇𝜇̂ = −10.0 and 𝜌𝜌�𝑐𝑐̂ = 2.0 then 𝜑𝜑� = −12.0 In other words, the impact of CH on undeveloped
parcel value is likely more negative than we find above when 𝜇𝜇̂ < 0 and likely less positive than
we find above when 𝜇𝜇̂ > 0.

We do believe that 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐�𝑀𝑀𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 , 𝟏𝟏[𝑇𝑇]𝑗𝑗 � < 0 is much more likely than 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐�𝑀𝑀𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 , 𝟏𝟏[𝑇𝑇]𝑗𝑗 � > 0. Even
though (Auffhammer et al. 2020) claim there is no widespread evidence that FWS significantly
modified CH boundaries to reflect economic concerns in two California CHs, we have serval
reasons to suspect this is not true more generally. First, there are many documented cases of
FWS working with large developers on ESA-compliant habitat conservation plans and other
mitigation strategies to avoid designating their land and projects as CH (Fosburgh 2022). For
example, during the creation of CH for the Pacific coast population of the western snowy
plover, the FWS worked with Lawson’s Landing Inc. and Oxfoot Associates to make Dillon Beach
in Marin County California CH-compliant. In exchange Dillon Beach was not made part of the
snowy Plover’s CH (USDOIFWS 2005). Presumably, the FWS is working with these companies to
avoid a likely “destruction or adverse modification finding.” Second, there are some
documented cases of slight changes to CH boundaries in response to economic realities. For
example,
[w]e modified the boundaries of this critical habitat designation around the City of
Gunnison. We refined the boundary to leave out areas of medium to high-intensity
development, airport runways, and golf courses. In all other areas, lands covered by
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buildings, pavement, and other manmade structures, as of the effective date of this
rule, are not included in this designation, even if they occur inside the boundaries of a
critical habitat unit, because such lands lack physical and biological features essential to
the conservation of Gunnison sage-grouse, and hence do not constitute critical habitat
as defined in section 3(5)(A)(i) of the Act. (p. 69313, USDOIFWS 2014).

In other words, FWS regulators appear to be looking for ways to avoid designating areas with
high Mjt as CH. Therefore, it is likely 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐�𝑀𝑀𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 , 𝟏𝟏[𝑇𝑇]𝑗𝑗 � < 0 in an unknowable number of cases.
And even though using matched control sales can reduce the potential of omitted variable bias
(i.e., if the parcels that are treated tend to have a lower Mjt so would the matched controls if
they happened to be treated), it may not eliminate it.
S4. Potential selection bias in DD estimators
Omitted variables are not the only potential source of bias in our estimates of DID coefficients.
CHs that have been revised several times due to new information, new scientific data, political
pressure, or court cases are not included in our study because they make identification of the
economic impact of CH more difficult (i.e., certain parcels may pop in and out of CH rapidly).
However, we suspect that these complex CHs are likely to have had a greater impact on land
prices than the “simple” CHs that we currently include in our study. Presumably, their
imposition of high economic cost is one of the main reasons for “complex” CHs unsettled path
to finalization.
For example, the originally proposed Canada Lynx CH included 27,530 sq. km. of commercially
managed forest land in Maine. However, for economic reasons, the final CH excluded all of this
Maine forest land because of the Maine forestry industry’s (voluntary) conservation strategy for
the Canada Lynx and FWS’ desire to “preserve partnerships” with Maine’s forest industry. Then,
three years later the FWS published a new “final” Canada Lynx CH that included most of this
previously excluded Maine forest land. We would not be surprised if a study of the most recent
final Canada Lynx CH uncovered evidence of negative impacts on affected forest land values
given that the “new” CH covered land deemed very import to Maine’s forest industry.
Therefore, by not including the potentially more expensive CHs like the Canada Lynx, our
estimates of the DID coefficients μ and ω likely underestimate the actual cost that CH imposes
on the American land values.
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SI Tables
Table S1. CHs included in our database.
Table S2. Descriptive statistics for data used to estimate the pooled OLS model. The untreated
data are from the matched set of untreated sales within the 5 KM buffer and ESA species range
space. All prices are in 2019 USD.
Sales type

No. of CHs with
at least one sale
No. of treated
sales
No. of control
sales
No. of treated
sales before
treatment
No. of treated
sales after
treatment
No. of control
sales before
treatment period
No. of control
sales after
treatment period
Avg. of log of
treated sale price
before treatment
(SD)
Avg. of log of
treated sale price
after treatment
(SD)
Avg. of log of
control sale price
before and after
treatment (SD)
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CH Set
Atlantic Amph. Riparian Plants
salmon

Terr.
CA
animals

CA
Amph.

1
1
1344
179
2673
360
69
37

8
9
1514
672
3020
1248
1014
455

38
41
9484
5234
16431
8892
4256
2202

17
21
247
218
481
429
42
63

5
6
21195
7099
40355
12467
13083
4071

12
15
1368
608
2719
1136
813
407

3
4
1213
579
2417
1080
794
400

130
98

1275
142

500
217

5228
3032

205
155

8112
3028

555
201

419
179

265
125

334
189

296
64

2114
761

8175
3805

118
157

25068
6771

1718
692

1660
671

Developed
23909
Undeveloped 11062

211
77

220
188

2377
296

906
487

8256
5087

363
272

15287
5696

1001
444

757
409

Developed

12.2109
(0.7544)
11.5379
(0.9934)
12.0869
(0.8861)
11.1711
(1.1409)
12.0848
(0.8126)
11.5276
(1.0606)

12.7507
(1.1716)
11.839
(1.8291)
12.79
(1.0175)
11.5217
(1.5907)
12.8618
(1.16)
11.7131
(1.9774)

8.6678
(2.3575)
7.3084
(0.9694)
11.4506
(1.0878)
10.4883
(1.5932)
11.2979
(1.5676)
9.9373
(1.9573)

12.7008
(1.2549)
11.6011
(1.4217)
12.8184
(1.0424)
11.7834
(1.4624)
12.7789
(1.2017)
11.7901
(1.4639)

11.5174
(1.4658)
10.3235
(1.8086)
11.5588
(1.1996)
10.4629
(1.6719)
11.5515
(1.3553)
10.3885
(1.7614)

12.6541
(0.9527)
11.3522
(1.4923)
12.791
(0.9445)
11.3628
(1.4442)
12.7564
(0.9457)
11.3353
(1.4144)

13.0626
(1.1536)
12.2971
(1.3716)
13.0534
(1.1163)
11.9276
(1.4581)
12.9314
(1.1187)
12.014
(1.4708)

13.1355
(0.805)
11.7731
(1.3325)
13.0986
(0.76)
11.9391
(1.4203)
13.1693
(0.7642)
11.9423
(1.4124)

13.1343
(0.8052)
11.7537
(1.3295)
13.088
(0.7168)
11.8936
(1.4327)
13.1731
(0.7551)
11.9163
(1.4152)

All

Jaguar

61
70
30928
12569
57271
21821
17381
6351

1
1
236
100
476
202
153
69

Gunn.
sagegrouse
1
1
279
198
554
377
149
100

Developed
13547
Undeveloped 6218

83
31

Developed
33362
Undeveloped 10759

Developed
Undeveloped
Developed
Undeveloped
Developed
Undeveloped
Developed
Undeveloped

12.6828
(1.4039)
Undeveloped 11.5874
(1.8061)
Developed
12.5113
(1.3496)
Undeveloped 11.2244
(1.7212)
Developed
12.534
(1.3435)
Undeveloped 11.336
(1.7813)

Table S3. Descriptive statistics for panel data used to estimate the panel model. The
untreated data are from the set of untreated sales within the 5 KM buffer of the CH and ESA
species range space. All prices are in 2019 USD.
Control set
Sales type
Number of CHs with at least one sale Developed
Undeveloped
Number of treated sales
Developed
Undeveloped
Number of untreated sales
Developed
Undeveloped
Number of treated sales before
Developed
treatment period
Undeveloped
Number of treated sales after
Developed
treatment period
Undeveloped
Number of untreated sales before
Developed
treatment period
Undeveloped
Number of untreated sales after
Developed
treatment period
Undeveloped
Average of log of treated sale price
Developed
before treatment (SD)
Undeveloped
Average of log of treated sale price
Developed
after treatment (SD)
Undeveloped
Average of log of untreated sale price Developed
(SD)
Undeveloped
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All

All observations
Matched

87
82
36637
12814
1409811
151856
19778
7230
16859
5584
649624
51647
760187
100209
12.494 (1.011)
11.43 (1.596)
12.429 (1.007)
11.517 (1.501)
12.449 (1.000)
11.456 (1.531)

45
49
21986
7558
40221
13361
13649
4087
8337
3471
24991
7146
15230
6215
12.756 (1.31)
11.856 (1.53)
12.514 (1.313)
11.215 (1.623)
12.566 (1.297)
11.468 (1.603)

All

Complete observations only
Matched

82
80
25533
9597
998186
131393
12750
5561
12783
4036
482611
42745
515575
88648
12.406 (1.011)
11.443 (1.591)
12.396 (1.011)
11.549 (1.48)
12.391 (1.002)
11.482 (1.52)

41
48
14574
5696
28252
10810
9040
3331
5534
2365
17772
6045
10480
4765
12.782 (1.333)
11.947 (1.509)
12.541 (1.324)
11.442 (1.572)
12.601 (1.31)
11.628 (1.562)

Table S4. Estimates of the pooled two-way FE OLS model’s DD coefficient 𝝁𝝁
� across all CHs
(national-level analysis) using different buffer sizes
3 KM buffer 5 KM buffer 10 KM buffer
-0.0103
-0.0217
-0.0183
Developed sales
(0.0483)
(0.0363)
(0.0374)
N of sales
84,464
88,199
88,448
N of CH
61
61
61
Undeveloped sales
0.0653
0.0074
0.0074
(0.0998)
(0.0741)
(0.1063)
N of sales
32,157
34,390
33,622
N of CH
70
70
70
Matched controls
Yes
Yes
Yes
Region-year hedonics
No
No
No

Notes: We used a fuzzy DD for all estimates of the pooled two-way FE OLS model where the fuzzy period begins at CH proposal
and ends at CH finalization. We clustered standard errors at the CH level (parcels that are part of a CH or that CH’s buffer form a
cluster). 5 KM buffer results are also given in Table 1, (3).
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Table S5. Estimates of the pooled OLS model’s DD coefficient 𝝁𝝁
� across subsets of CHs using
different buffer sizes
(1)

Panel A

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

3 KM buffer
5 KM buffer
10 KM buffer
Developed Undeveloped Developed Undeveloped Developed Undeveloped
sales
sales
sales
sales
sales
sales

Jaguar

0.0608
-0.3859
0.0382
-0.4155
(0.1241)
(0.3841)
(0.1194)
(0.2767)
N of sales
708
307
712
302
N of CHs
1
1
1
1
Gunnison sage-grouse
-0.1814
-0.1724
-0.094
-0.277
(0.1203)
(0.2175)
(0.1535)
(0.2797)
N of sales
815
583
833
575
N of CHs
1
1
1
1
Atlantic salmon
-0.2463
-0.5602*
-0.4298** 0.1762
(0.343)
(0.3037)
(0.1812)
(0.3498)
N of sales
2930
395
4017
539
N of CHs
1
1
1
1

0.0938
-0.7528***
(0.1242)
(0.2729)
715
303
1
1
-0.1743
-0.3036
(0.1267)
(0.2003)
821
585
1
1
-0.4472*** 0.0530
(0.1696)
(0.3668)
3656
495
1
1

Amphibians

0.0646
0.3586
(0.0914)
(0.4774)
4539
1949
8
9
-0.0581*** -0.1808***
(0.004)
(0.0385)
62232
18702
5
6
0.009
-0.2764***
(0.1563)
(0.062)
733
644
17
21
0.0945
0.2557**
(0.0735)
(0.1052)
25477
14226
38
41

Panel B

0.1341*
0.9547**
0.0522
0.4408
(0.0711)
(0.3935)
(0.0925)
(0.475)
N of sales
5508
2394
4534
1920
N of CHs
8
9
8
9
Terrestrial animals
-0.0636*** -0.0936*** -0.0628*** -0.0924**
(0.0049)
(0.0264)
(0.0045)
(0.0366)
N of sales
59336
17995
61550
19566
N of CHs
5
6
5
6
Flowering plants
-0.2002
-0.1845*** -0.0737
-0.2338***
(0.1194)
(0.04)
(0.1028)
(0.0744)
N of sales
732
649
728
647
N of CHs
17
21
17
21
Riparian species
0.1367*
0.2610**
0.0846
0.1700
(0.0722)
(0.117)
(0.0668)
(0.1454)
N of sales
24390
13471
25915
14126
N of CHs
38
41
38
41

Matched controls
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Region-year hedonics
No
No
No
No
No
No
Notes: We used a fuzzy DD for all estimates of the pooled two-way FE OLS model where the fuzzy period begins at CH proposal
and ends at CH finalization. Panel B notes. We clustered standard at the CH level (parcels that are part of a CH or that CH’s
buffer form a cluster). Terrestrial animals are mammals, birds, and reptiles. Riparian species are amphibians, clams, fishes, and
snails.
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Table S6. Estimates of the pooled OLS model’s DD coefficient 𝝁𝝁
� across CH cohorts with similar
time event profiles
CH Cohort
1

CH proposal; CH finalization;
and post-treatment sales
periods:
6/06–11/06; 8/07–12/07;
12/07–12/09
N of sales
N of CHs
2
CH proposal; CH finalization;
and post-treatment sales
periods:
8/11–11/11; 7/12–11/12;
11/12–11/14
N of sales
N of CHs
3
CH proposal; CH finalization;
and post-treatment sales
periods:
5/12–10/12; 7/13–12/13; and
12/13–12/15
N of sales
N of CHs
Matched controls
County-time hedonics

(1)
Developed
sales

(2)
Developed
sales

(3)
(4)
Undeveloped Undeveloped
sales
sales

-0.1586
(0.1271)

__

-0.1701
(0.4382)

781
5
-0.3638*
(0.1747)

781
5
-0.41397
(0.4333)

Yes
No

708
6
0.1889***
(0.0351)

5064
5

529
7
-0.0737
(0.2471)

708
6
0.0135
(0.0074)

Yes
Yes

0.89072
(1.8634)

5064
5

529
7
0.08038
(0.1899)

499
7
-0.0194
(0.1735)

Yes
No

499
7
0.1758
(0.3156)

1852
4

Yes
Yes

1852
4

Notes. The buffer around CH polygons is 5 KM. We used a fuzzy DD for all estimates of the pooled two-way FE OLS model
where the fuzzy period begins at CH proposal and ends at CH finalization. We clustered standard errors at the CH level (parcels
that are part of a CH or that CH’s buffer form a cluster). Rank-order issues prevented estimation of DD coefficient for cohort 1
CHs over developed parcel sales when county-year specific hedonic functions were used.
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Table S7. Fraction of estimated hedonic price function explanatory variable coefficients that
are of expected sign in estimates of the pooled OLS model across the three CH cohorts with
similar time event profiles. Cells are shaded green if more that 50% of the coefficient estimates
conform to the expected sign.
(1)
CH cohort
Zj (expected coefficient sign)
Lake frontage (+)
Elevation (+)
Hectares (+)
Slope (-)
Travel time to major cities (-)
Min. distance to highway (-)
Min. distance to paved road (-)
% building footprint w/in 5 km radius (+)
% coast w/in 2.5 km radius (+)
% protected w/in 1 km radius (+)
% wet (+)
Xjt (expected coefficient sign)
Number of rooms (+)
Number of baths (+)
Age (-)
Building gross area (+)
Matched controls
County-year hedonics
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1

(2)
(3)
(4)
Developed sales
All 3
2
3
cohorts
0.581
0.497
0.448
0.514
0.511
0.559
0.508
0.564
NA
0.443
0.524

(5)
1

0.750
0.571
0.714
0.400
0.368
0.471
0.485
0.714
NA
0.467
0.645

0.800
0.571
0.375
0.405
0.667
0.607
0.489
0.632
NA
0.423
0.567

0.529
0.447
0.430
0.576
0.476
0.578
0.523
0.533
NA
0.446
0.463

0.750
0.500
0.636
0.333
0.462
0.548
0.552
0.600
NA
0.667
0.554

0.667
0.667
0.500
0.632
Yes
Yes

0.400
0.382
0.659
0.603
Yes
Yes

0.688
0.644
0.805
0.675
0.703
0.654
0.735
0.682
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

(6)
(7)
(8)
Undeveloped sales
All 3
2
3
cohorts
1.000
0.515
0.607
0.542
0.520
0.586
0.486
0.500
NA
0.450
0.536

0.579
0.476
0.652
0.544
0.520
0.500
0.510
0.440
NA
0.517
0.470

0.625
0.486
0.642
0.514
0.510
0.526
0.516
0.458
NA
0.538
0.505

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Table S8. CHs in each cohort where a cohort includes CHs that were proposed and finalized at
the approximate same time
Cohort 1
• Yadon's piperia
(Piperia yadonii)
• Chipola slabshell
(Elliptio chipolaensis)
• Fat threeridge
(Amblema neislerii)
• Gulf moccasinshell
(Medionidus penicillatus)
• Ochlockonee moccasinshell
(Medionidus simpsonianus)
• Oval pigtoe
(Pleurobema pyriforme)
• Purple bankclimber
(Elliptoideus sloatianus)
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Cohort 2
• DeBeque phacelia
(Phacelia submutica)
• Pagosa skyrocket
(Ipomopsis polyantha)
• Narrow pigtoe
(Fusconaia escambia)
• Tapered pigtoe
(Fusconaia burkei)
• Chucky Madtom
(Noturus crypticus)
• Rush Darter
(Etheostoma phytophilum)
• Yellowcheek Darter
(Etheostoma moorei)
• Laurel dace
(Chrosomus saylori)

Cohort 3
• Jollyville Plateau Salamander
(Eurycea tonkawae)
• Diamond Darter
(Crystallaria cincotta)
• Fluted kidneyshell
(Ptychobranchus subtentus)
• Slabside Pearlymussel
(Pleuronaia dolabelloides)
• Franciscan manzanita
(Arctostaphylos franciscana)

Table S9. Estimates of the pooled OLS model’s DD coefficient 𝝁𝝁
� across all CHs (national-level
analysis) using alternative definitions of developed parcels
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Developed sales Developed sales Developed sales Undeveloped
- Default
- High BPR
- Low BPR
sales
-0.0217
-0.0261
0.0105
0.0074
(0.0363)
(0.0328)
(0.0627)
(0.0741)
N of sales
88199
75470
12729
34390
N of CHs
61
42
56
70
Matched control
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Region-time hedonics No
No
No
No

Notes. The buffer around CH polygons is 5 KM. WE used a fuzzy DD for all estimates of the pooled two-way FE OLS model
where the fuzzy period begins at CH proposal and ends at CH finalization. We clustered standard errors at the CH level (parcels
that are part of a CH or that CH’s buffer form a cluster).
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SI Figures

Figure S1. Map of all CHs in our dataset. Each CH is different background colors.
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Figure S2. Map of CH and control sales between 2000 and 2019. Each green dot represents a
parcel in a CH that had at least one sale between 2000 and 2019. Each red dot represents a
parcel that had at least one matched control sale between 2000 and 2019. The polygons in the
background are the CH areas included in our dataset. Many dots cannot be seen due to the
coarseness of this map’s spatial scale.
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Figure S3. Map of Gunnison sage-grouse CH and control sales between 2000 and 2019. Each
green dot represents a parcel in the Gunnison sage-grouse CH that had at least one sale
between 2000 and 2019. Each red dot represents a parcel that had at least one matched
control sale between 2000 and 2019. The orange boundary is the CH borders while the blue
boundary represents 5 km buffer.
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Figure S4. Map of Jaguar CH and control sales between 2000 and 2019. Each green dot
represents a parcel in the jaguar CH that had at least one sale between 2000 and 2019. Each
red dot represents a parcel that had at least one matched control sale between 2000 and 2019.
The orange boundary is the CH borders while the blue boundary represents 5 km buffer. Sales
of any parcel that were ineligible for inclusion in our dataset for other reasons are not shown
here.
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Figure S5. Map of Atlantic Salmon CH and control sales between 2000 and 2019. Each green
dot represents a parcel in the Atlantic Salmon CH that had at least one sale between 2000 and
2019. Each red dot represents a parcel that had at least one matched control sale between
2000 and 2019. The orange boundary is the CH borders while the blue boundary represents 5
km buffer. Sales of any parcel that were ineligible for inclusion in our dataset for other reasons
are not shown here.
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A. Developed sales

B. Undeveloped sales

Figure S6. Mean of log of price per ha (lines indicate ±1 SD) in Atlantic salmon CH by years
before or since Atlantic salmon CH establishment. A. Developed parcel sales. B. Undeveloped
parcel sales. Only matched untreated sales are included in these averages. A. Treated sales
before treatment period: 69. Treated sales after treatment period: 1275. Untreated sales
before treatment period: 296. Untreated sales after treatment period: 2377. B. Treated sales
before treatment period: 37. Treated sales after treatment period: 142. Untreated sales before
treatment period: 64. Untreated sales after treatment period: 296.

A. Developed sales

B. Undeveloped sales

Figure S7. Mean of log of price per ha (lines indicate ±1 SD) in Jaguar CH by years before or
since Jaguar CH establishment. A. Developed parcel sales. B. Undeveloped parcel sales. The xaxis gives years before or after treatment and the y-axis gives the average of log�𝑉𝑉𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 �. Only
matched control sales are included in these averages. A. Treated sales before treatment period:
153. Treated sales after treatment period: 83. Untreated sales before treatment period: 265.
Untreated sales after treatment period: 211. B. Treated sales before treatment period: 69.
Treated sales after treatment period: 31. Untreated sales before treatment period: 125.
Untreated sales after treatment period: 77.
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A. Developed sales

B. Undeveloped sales

Figure S8. Mean of log of price per ha (lines indicate ±1 SD) in Gunnison Sage-Grouse CH by
years before or since Gunnison Sage-Grouse CH establishment. A. Developed parcel sales. B.
Undeveloped parcel sales. Only matched untreated sales are included in these averages. A.
Treated sales before treatment period: 149. Treated sales after treatment period: 130.
Untreated sales before treatment period: 334. Untreated sales after treatment period: 220. B.
Treated sales before treatment period: 100. Treated sales after treatment period: 98.
Untreated sales before treatment period: 189. Untreated sales after treatment period: 188.

A. Developed sales

B. Undeveloped sales

Figure S9. Mean of log of price per ha (lines indicate ±1 SD) in amphibian CHs by years before
or since amphibian CH establishment. A. Developed parcel sales. B. Undeveloped parcel sales.
Only matched untreated sales are included in these averages. A. Treated sales before
treatment period: 1014. Treated sales after treatment period: 500. Untreated sales before
treatment period: 2114. Untreated sales after treatment period: 906. B. Treated sales before
treatment period: 455. Treated sales after treatment period: 217. Untreated sales before
treatment period: 761. Untreated sales after treatment period: 487.
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A. Developed sales

B. Undeveloped sales

Figure S10. Mean of log of price per ha (lines indicate ±1 SD) in terrestrial animal CHs by years
before or since terrestrial animal CH establishment. A. Developed parcel sales. B.
Undeveloped parcel sales. Only matched untreated sales are included in these averages. A.
Treated sales before treatment period: 13083. Treated sales after treatment period: 8112.
Untreated sales before treatment period: 26163. Untreated sales after treatment period:
16190. B. Treated sales before treatment period: 4071. Treated sales after treatment period:
3028. Untreated sales before treatment period: 7952. Untreated sales after treatment period:
6286.

A. Developed sales

B. Undeveloped sales

Figure S11. Mean of log of price per ha (lines indicate ±1 SD) in flowering plant CHs by years
before or since flowering plant CH establishment. A. Developed parcel sales. B. Undeveloped
parcel sales. Only matched untreated sales are included in these averages. A. Treated sales
before treatment period: 42. Treated sales after treatment period: 205. Untreated sales before
treatment period: 118. Untreated sales after treatment period: 363. B. Treated sales before
treatment period: 63. Treated sales after treatment period: 155. Untreated sales before
treatment period: 157. Untreated sales after treatment period: 272.
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A. Developed sales

B. Undeveloped sales

Figure S12. Mean of log of price per ha (lines indicate ±1 SD) in riparian CHs by years before or
since riparian CH establishment. A. Developed parcel sales. B. Undeveloped parcels sales.
Only matched untreated sales are included in these averages. A. Treated sales before
treatment period: 4256. Treated sales after treatment period: 5228. Untreated sales before
treatment period: 9062. Untreated sales after treatment period: 10799. B. Treated sales before
treatment period: 2202. Treated sales after treatment period: 3032. Untreated sales before
treatment period: 4399. Untreated sales after treatment period: 6479.

A. Developed sales

B. Undeveloped sales

Figure S13. Mean of log of price per ha (lines indicate ±1 SD) in California CHs by years before
or since California CH establishment. A. Developed parcel sales. B. Undeveloped parcels sales.
Only matched untreated sales are included in these averages. A. Treated sales before
treatment period: 831. Treated sales after treatment period: 609. Untreated sales before
treatment period: 1768. Untreated sales after treatment period: 1097. B. Treated sales before
treatment period: 413. Treated sales after treatment period: 215. Untreated sales before
treatment period: 706. Untreated sales after treatment period: 471.
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A. Developed sales

B. Undeveloped sales

Figure S14. Mean of log of price per ha (lines indicate ±1 SD) in California amphibian CHs by
years before or since California amphibian CH establishment. A. Developed parcel sales. B.
Undeveloped parcels sales. Only matched untreated sales are included in these averages. A.
Treated sales before treatment period: 794. Treated sales after treatment period: 419.
Untreated sales before treatment period: 1666. Untreated sales after treatment period: 759. B.
Treated sales before treatment period: 400. Treated sales after treatment period: 179.
Untreated sales before treatment period: 671. Untreated sales after treatment period: 409.

Figure S15. Estimates of the pooled two-way FE OLS model’s DD coefficients (± SE x 1.96)
across all CHs (national-level analysis) with different buffer sizes.
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Figure S16. Estimates of the pooled two-way FE OLS model’s DD coefficients (± SE x 1.96)
across CHs subsets with different buffer sizes.

Figure S17. Estimates of the pooled two-way FE OLS model’s DD coefficients (± SE x 1.96)
across CH cohorts with similar time event profiles. Region in this case refers to counties.
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